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ABSTRACT 
South Australia is challenged with one of the driest and hottest climates in Australia, 
and the impacts of anthropogenic climate change are expected to seriously exacerbate 
existing risks from heat waves, water shortages, and inundation. Adaptation to these 
climate change risks are now broadly accepted as necessary and unavoidable, and 
although a burgeoning and multidisciplinary research focus has examined public 
understanding of climate change, little empirical social psychological work has focused 
on the South Australian context, especially in terms of adaptation understandings. 
Moreover, scant qualitative research has been conducted that sensitively considers 
individuals’ own sense making practices: scrutinising participants’ own words, as they 
frame and make sense of climate change risk and adaptation in reference to personal, 
social, institutional and material contexts. 
 
This report summarises research conducted by the Discipline of Public Health at The 
University of Adelaide, augmenting knowledge of how South Australians construe and 
rationalise climate change risk and adaptation responses. The research project 
comprises two interlinked studies. First, four semi-structured focus groups were 
conducted in Adelaide and regional South Australia, which included 22 participants in 
total. The focus group study’s principle objective was to garner and analyse discursive 
data to enhance understanding of what constrains or promotes climate change 
perception and adaptation. Second, a state-wide quantitative/qualitative survey, with a 
weighted sample of 500 South Australian participants, examined people’s climate 
change risk domain perceptions, affective imagery, adaptation ‘self-efficacy’, 
government responsibility, and adaptation knowledge.  
 
The focus group analysis found that climate was recurrently represented as a risk that 
was to be chiefly confronted by younger and future generations, and that it lacked 
salience in an everyday context, especially when contrasted to what are perceived as 
more urgent concerns, such as employment and income worries. Some participants 
invoked direct and vicarious experiential ‘evidence’ for climate change, instantiating 
local weather events as manifestations of how the phenomenon is, or will, impact on 
their communities. Some participants intuitively understood that resilience to the risks 
posed by climate change is constrained by socio-economic factors - including income, 
health and housing discrepancies.  
 
The survey results strongly suggest that the eight climate change risk domains noted in 
the survey were perceived as serious threats. However, a majority endorsed a ‘mixed 
cause’ explanation (natural fluctuation/human induced) to account for what was 
causing climate change. Resonating with the focus groups findings, a significant 
proportion of respondents reported believing that climate change would begin in ‘20’ or 
‘50’ years and a significant percentage reported ‘concern for future generations’. 
Climate change held an array of negatively valenced connotative meanings, images 
and terms, including water shortages, extreme heat, flood/sea-level rise, scepticism 
and lack of scientific clarity and ideas of catastrophe and extinction. Notably, a 
moderate proportion of respondents could not give an account of how they would 
protect themselves from heat waves, inundation, or water shortages, arising from 
climate change. The present research has important implications for the design and 
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promulgation of climate change risk and adaptation messages that address public 
engagement in South Australia. It is argued that although public engagement on 
climate change and adaptation would benefit from myriad approaches, but it is 
essential that communication efforts be segmented in accord with the interests, social 
norms, values, knowledge, and material realities of heterogeneous audiences. If the 
risks posed by climate change are to be effectively addressed, they will need to be 
shaped in forms that reduce the ‘psychological distance’ of climate change.  
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
In late 2011, the National Climate Change Adaptation Research Facility (NCCARF) 
engaged the Discipline of Public Health at The University of Adelaide to improve 
knowledge of how South Australians perceived and understood the likely adverse 
implications arising from a changed climate, and how associated adaptation choices 
were represented. This research was conducted in two complementary phases, and 
the following report details the findings yielded from four focus groups conducted in the 
cities of Port Adelaide/Enfield, Noarlunga, Mount Gambier and Whyalla - and a 
telephone survey, conducted with a representative sample of 500 South Australians. 
 
The focus group study recruited 22 participants and elicited, in their own words, a wide 
range of people’s views and sense-making practices pertaining to climate change and 
adaptation. The major themes identified are summarised below.  
The survey study utilised Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing (CATI) to further 
explore the salient themes identified in the focus groups. Specifically, the survey 
investigated the following questions: what climate change risk domains are salient to 
people in South Australia; to what degree are ‘human’ and ‘natural’ factors depicted as 
causing climate change; the kinds of affective imagery associated with climate change 
risk; people’s knowledge of adaptation practices; and the extent to which respondents 
felt they could successfully engage in adaptation practices. The principle findings from 
the survey are summarised below. 
 
This study makes a novel contribution to the literature on climate change 
understanding in South Australia, and has gone some way toward satisfying the 
overarching aim of conducting research with translational application, facilitating the 
development of knowledge that informs best practice for strategising on climate change 
adaptation and communication. We envisage that this report will constitute a timely and 
practical resource for policy makers - especially those engaging in the development of 
climate change adaptation plans - fellow researchers, councils, community 
environment groups, and other stakeholders in South Australia who hold an interest in 
this most critical phenomenon. We anticipate that this study will stimulate further 
research attending to the examination of community understandings of climate change, 
especially with methods that holistically explicate the dynamic social, material and 
psychological processes impacting on how individuals make sense of its dangers and 
associated adaptation responses.   
 
KEY FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS FROM THE SOUTH AUSTRALIAN 
COMMUNITY FOCUS GROUPS AND SURVEY 
 
1. A recurrent and striking theme across the focus groups and survey was 
participants’ representation of climate change as a phenomenon to be confronted 
chiefly by younger and future generations. This suggests a salient ‘temporal 
distancing’ (i.e. the risk is significant in the future, more than the present) of climate 
change could be a feature of community understanding. Interestingly, although 
some focus group participants accepted that climate change would principally 
affect those living after their own time had passed, they nevertheless remained 
concerned for their children and grandchildren’s quality of life. Similarly, some 
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focus group participants represented the issue of climate change as lacking 
salience and urgency in an everyday context, especially when compared to the 
cost of living or health and employment worries. These findings have important 
implications for how policy, public engagement and communication strategies 
overcome the ‘psychological distance’ often attributed to climate change risk. 
Communications that frame risk messages in language that accentuates the 
impacts on future generations could successfully engender risk perception and 
action, especially for those holding pre-existing intergenerational concerns about 
the impacts of climate change. 
 
2. Focus group participants recurrently invoked ‘evidence’ for climate change, 
instantiating local and international events and impacts as manifestations of a 
changing climate. The invocation of ‘exemplars’ of climate change was 
fundamental to constructing arguments for, or against, the idea that the process 
was underway. This finding is important because it attests to the power of ‘climate 
change events’ to act as analogues for conceptualising and envisaging future 
climate change impacts on the region. Moulding local climate change 
communications that speak to the potential impacts on familiar landscapes and 
built environments could be instrumental in concretising the phenomenon in the 
here and now. 
 
3. Adaptation practices were variably reported in the survey. When asked what they 
could do to protect themselves from extreme heat related to climate change, 26% 
of respondents summoned behavioural strategies such as staying out of the sun, 
drinking water, and drawing window shades. Notably, 24% of respondents 
answered ‘don’t know’. Likewise, when asked what adaptation action they would 
take to protect themselves from flooding, 43% reported that they did not live in an 
area prone to flooding. Very few respondents provided pragmatic strategies, such 
as ‘using sandbags around the house’ (3%), suggesting that, on the whole, 
perceived risk from flooding engenders few pragmatic adaptation strategies. 
Overall, these findings suggest that adaptation and resilience to climate change is 
differentiated by risk domain, local perceptions of vulnerability, and social 
stratification factors, such as income disparity. It is imperative that future research 
seeks to delineate the myriad contributory factors impacting on adaptation 
resilience for different social groups in different settings. 
 
4. When asked about the cause of climate change, 52% of survey respondents 
reported it was jointly attributable to ‘natural fluctuations in the earth’s climate’ and 
‘human causes’. Of these, a majority reported causal ratios (natural 
fluctuations/human cause) in the range of 30/70, 40/60, or 50/50-60/40. This 
finding suggests that the causal attributions people make for climate change are 
complex, and may more broadly play a role in perceptions of risk and associated 
adaptive responses. 
 
5. Respondents rated all climate change risk domains (extreme heat, water 
shortages, flooding from sea-level rise, flooding from rain, food shortages, threat to 
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industry, risk from serious disease, risks to natural environment) as posing a 
serious threat to South Australia over the next 50 years. Particularly noteworthy 
was the response to ‘risk from serious disease’ - rated as significantly less 
threatening than all other risk domains.  
 
6. Sixty-five percent of survey respondents reported that they ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly 
agreed’ with the proposition that risks associated with a changing climate could be 
‘reduced by their own actions’. Interestingly, 55.2% either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly 
agreed’ that the government bore ‘ultimate responsibility for protecting them from 
climate change risks’. This finding suggests that some South Australians 
understand responsibility for coping with the threat of climate change as a shared, 
government-individual/community responsibility. 
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1. BACKGROUND 
The state of South Australia is likely to face considerable risks from rising sea levels, 
extreme heat events, and reduced rainfall resulting from anthropogenic climate change 
(CSIRO-BoM, 2007, 2011; DCCEE, 2011). Over the next decade, heat-related deaths 
are, without an effective adaptation response, projected to double (McMichael et al., 
2002), and extended dry periods will place further pressure on the already struggling 
Murray-Darling basin, an important source for drinking water and agriculture in South 
Australia (DCCEE, 2011). Moreover, the risks posed by rising sea levels are expected 
to seriously increase the frequency of coastal flooding, and between 25,200 and 
43,000 South Australian homes may be vulnerable to inundation by the end of this 
century (DCCEE, 2011).  
 
Australian and international research (e.g. CSIRO, 2009; IPCC, 2007; World Bank, 
2012) examining the causes of climate change and its adverse implications for 
biophysical and social systems, as well as built environments, have provided clear and 
compelling evidence. However, in Australia, and especially in the state of South 
Australia - a state confronted with a unique set of biophysical challenges - a paucity of 
empirical psychological research (but see Buckeley, 2000) has examined how 
individuals construe climate change risks and adaptation practices. This research 
project addresses this gap, and responds to the imperative to augment biophysical 
assessments of risk and vulnerability with social-scientific examinations of the sense-
making and sociological processes, putatively implicated in climate change risk 
understandings.  
Risk and vulnerability assessments do important work in identifying those most 
exposed to the impacts of climate change. However, as is most obvious in the on-going 
debate on climate change in Australia, formal risk assessments and projections by 
themselves do not determine how social groups will judge what constitutes dangerous 
climate change (Lorenzoni, Pidgeon, & O’Connor, 2005). According to Dessai et al., 
(2004), climate change understandings are akin to value judgments, built upon what is 
meaningful and contextually relevant in any particular time or place. 
 
Accordingly, this study’s objectives are built upon the assumption that climate change 
should be understood within the bounds of relevant social and institutional settings, as 
a social phenomenon intricately and inescapably intertwined with the social 
construction of knowledge (e.g. Beck, 1992; Dessai et al., 2004; Pettenger, 2007; 
Smith & Joffe, 2009, 2012). Thus, the focus of this research is tuned to explicating the 
social constructions, symbolic systems, knowledges and rationalisations brought to 
bear in making meaning out of climate change. We give primacy to these socio-
psychological components of climate change risk perception because extending our 
knowledge of these factors will inform strategies that are contextualised, that 
deconstruct barriers to coping with what will be the inevitable consequences arising 
from climate change. 
 
In summary, socio-psychological factors are the least well understood component of 
climate change (IPCC, 2007), and because these factors arguably function to attenuate 
or compel adaptive and mitigative practices, it is crucial that research attends to how 
climate change understanding is mediated via social and psychological processes.  
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1.1 Research context 
In many Western countries grappling with the threat of dangerous climate change, 
public discourses have been largely characterised, especially in the media, by debate 
over whether climate change constitutes a ‘real’ phenomenon, and to what degree it 
poses risks to humans and natural systems. These debates, and more importantly, the 
effect these debates have on public assessments of climate change risk, will have 
ongoing implications for how mitigation and adaptation policies are formulated by 
decision makers, and how these policies are subsequently accepted and taken up by 
the public (Leiserowitz, 2006). Thus, a burgeoning and methodologically eclectic social-
scientific and psychological literature has attempted to better understand public 
perceptions of climate change, recognising that important insights can made that could 
subsequently foster public engagement, and inform the design of risk and adaptation 
communications (e.g. Lever-Tracy, 2010; Lorenzoni, O’Neill, & Whitmarsh, 2007; 
Moser & Dilling, 2007; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Swim et al., 2009; Whitmarsh, 
O’Neill, & Lorenzoni, 2011) 
 
Australian research on climate change perceptions, understandings, appraisals and 
degrees of ‘concern’, has been dominated by quantitative survey methodologies, which 
for the most part have been conducted by market research agencies, (notable 
exceptions include, Leviston & Walker, 2011; Ashworth, Jeanneret, Gardener, & Shaw, 
2011; Reser, Bradley, Glendon, & Ellul, 2012a, 2012b). For example, in a recent review 
of ‘Australians’ views of climate change’, Leviston and Walker reported that out of 16 
surveys conducted from 2008 to 2011, around half of these studies were conducted by 
agencies such as Newspoll, Australian Gallop Polls, Ipsos-Eureka and The Lowry 
Institute. Taken on the whole, what most of this research suggests is that a significant 
majority of Australians ‘believe’ that climate change is now occurring, and agree that it 
was at least in-part, human-induced. For example, Newspoll (2011) reported that 78% 
of respondents endorsed the statement that climate change was occurring “for any 
reason” (human induced or naturally caused). However this percentage dropped away 
to 58% when respondents were asked if climate change were “partly caused by human 
activity”, and 14 % when asked if it was “entirely caused by human activity”.  
 
Similarly, Leviston and Walker (2011) surveyed 5035 people across Australia and 
asked whether climate change was happening: 82.8% responded “yes”. When asked to 
choose from a selection of fixed response options of causes for climate change, 40.2% 
attributed climate change to “natural fluctuations in the earth’s temperatures”, and 
50.4% responded that “humans are largely causing it”. In contrast, the Ipsos-Eureka 
(2010) Climate Change Report found that when respondents were asked to choose the 
“main cause of climate change”, 23% rated “greenhouse gas emissions from industry”, 
and another 14% selected “burning of fossil fuels”. In Australia Reser et al. (2012a) 
found that 73.9% of Australian respondents believed that “the world’s climate is 
changing” and 27% believed that “climate change is mainly caused by human activity”. 
 
While survey work conducted in Australia on public perceptions of climate change has 
clearly augmented knowledge of what Australians think about climate change - albeit 
within the boundaries of forced-choice survey formats - a dearth of empirical enquiry 
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has attempted to explicate common-sense understandings with mixed-methods, or 
qualitative methodologies  There is a crucial need for research to employ sensitive and 
fine-grained analysis of the complex contents of peoples’ sense making around climate 
change, and how these understandings are framed and mediated by social and 
geographical contexts. Moreover, how public understanding of climate change risk and 
adaptation are further delineated in the South Australian context, a state that is already 
vulnerable to water shortages and extreme heat, is a particularly under-researched 
domain.   
1.1.1 Researching risk and its application to climate change  
Psychologists have been researching and theorising on how people and societies’ 
perceive and respond to natural and human-made risks for over 50 years (Hacking, 
2003; Slovic, 1987; 2000; Starr, 1969). More recently, various models of ‘risk 
perception’ have been applied to climate change (Bostrom, et al., 2012; Breakwell, 
2007, 2010; Pidgeon & Butler, 2009). In this section we provide a general overview of 
this work and its convergent application to public understanding of climate change. 
In the 1960’s, rapid technological advances and the proliferation of nuclear energy 
gave rise to public concern about how safe these new technologies were for the public. 
As Slovic (1987) contends, public perception of the risks associated with these 
developments, often communicated via the news media (also see Kasperson et al., 
1988), contrasted sharply with ‘objective’ risk assessments made by experts. Thus, the 
psychological discipline of ‘risk perception’ grew out of an imperative to better 
understand how people evaluate risk - informing communication strategy and 
predicting societal responses to hazards (Slovic, 1987). In psychology, risk perception 
research has been dominated by the psychometric paradigm that utilises quantitative 
scaling techniques to build representative ‘cognitive maps’ of risk attitudes. A core 
assumption underpinning the psychometric paradigm1 of risk perception is that if 
individuals perceive a significant threat, and this threat meets a number of criteria in 
terms of its ‘risk characteristics’, they will respond accordingly with mitigating 
behaviour, or will support institutional actions that ameliorate these threats. Most 
obviously, then, if a risk is not perceived in this fashion, for whatever reason, then 
apposite behavioural responses cannot be expected.  
The empirical aim of understanding discrepancies between ‘objective’ risk 
assessments, usually derived from statistical quantification of fatalities derived by 
experts’, and how this hazard is ‘perceived’ by non-experts as measured by 
psychometric questionnaires, is well established in multiple research domains, 
including psychology (Slovic, 2000).  
The psychometric paradigm attempts to build cognitive, socio-psychological and 
cultural models of subjective risk judgments that characterise hazards in terms of: a) 
how well the risk is understood; b) feelings of ‘dread’ associated with the hazard; c) 
                                               
1
 This core assumption also underpins other psychological theories, such as Theory of Reasoned Action 
(Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980) and Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1975; Witte & Allen, 2000) 
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‘catastrophic potential’; d) ‘controllability’; e) ‘voluntariness’; f) ‘stigma’ (imagery and 
associated affect associated with hazard) and; g) perceived risk vs. perceived benefit 
(Slovic, 2000). According to Slovic, when there is limited or missing ‘empirical data’ on 
a hazard2, people generally make biased, probability estimations of risk, employing 
cognitive heuristics to make erroneous judgements. Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, 
Layman & Combs’ (1978) emblematic study of heuristic biases associated with judging 
the frequency of lethal events evidences how risk is conceptualised within the 
psychometric paradigm as a fundamentally cognitive phenomenon. In their experiment, 
Lichtenstein and colleagues found that participants systematically overestimated the 
frequency of fatalities attributable to events such as tornados and botulism, but 
underestimated the frequency attributable to more common causes, such as strokes, 
diabetes and other less ‘sensationalised’ modes of death, such as asthma; that is, 
“silent killers” (p. 575).  
These results are partially explained as a function of unrepresentative media coverage, 
misleading people to believe that sensationalistic forms of death are more common 
than they really are. Moreover, according to Lichtenstein et al. (1978) the studies’ 
‘subjects’, the ubiquitous university student sample, may have been underexposed to 
more every day, age-related causes of death, such as stroke. Although this study’s 
results are ultimately attributed to biases in “people’s cognitive storage and retrieval 
processes” (p. 575) (also see Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), it is arguable that what this 
study also shows is that risk judgements are not only influenced by erroneous cognitive 
biases, but are concomitantly affected by social knowledge communicated via the 
media and a variety of other social sources. 
In general terms, the psychometric approach attempts to disentangle factors that 
influence risk perception, which formulate predictive models that “represent the 
relationship between perceptions, behaviour and the qualitative characteristics of these 
hazards” (Slovic, 2000 p xxiv), and researchers have examined a wide range of risk 
domains, from nuclear power (Kunreuther, Easterling, Desvousges & Slovic, 1990), to 
automobiles (MacGregor & Slovic, 1989). Risk characteristics, such as degree of 
understanding of the risk (knowledge), probability of the hazard (likelihood), 
catastrophic potential (severity), and affective qualities (i.e. dread), appear to be the 
most relevant to climate change (e.g. Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006). 
The perception of climate change as a risk domain and its perceived causes are 
closely related concepts. In psychology, attributional reasoning is generally accepted 
as integral to how people explain events and interpersonal phenomena (e.g., Heider, 
1958; Hewstone, 1989; Kelly, 1955; Weiner, 1979,). The role of causal accounting is 
not only attuned to making sense of phenomena, rendering it knowable, but can often 
serve to justify  and excuse social action (Hewstone, 1989; Hanson-Easey & 
Augoustinos, 2010). Climate change is recurrently framed in public and scientific 
discourses in terms of the causal role of human activities in forcing changes to the 
earth’s biospheric system (Reser et al., 2012a). Bostrom and colleagues (2012) have 
demonstrated how causal beliefs can influence individuals’ acceptance of various 
climate change policies. In their study, those participants who supported ‘engineering 
                                               
2
 It is hard to imagine what would constitute having all the ‘empirical data’ on any assumed risk. 
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policy actions’ (i.e. putting more dust into the atmosphere), were most likely to believe 
that climate change was causally attributable to ‘volcanoes’ and ‘environmental harms’ 
than to carbon emission. Conversely, support for carbon reduction policies (i.e. 
increased taxes on fossil fuel) was correlated with beliefs that carbon emissions were 
fundamental in causing climate change.  Although these authors do make claims about 
the direction of such a reasoning process, what can be taken from these findings is that 
beliefs about cause play a role in rationalising people’s broader orientation to what to 
do about climate change, and how far they would go in supporting policies that are 
perceived as ‘difficult’ (e.g. placing a tax on carbon).    
The convergent psychological and sociological literature and theory on public 
understanding and perception of climate change is multifarious. However, Reser and 
Swim (2011) have attempted to synthesise myriad psychological, environmental, and 
social factors mediating human responses to climate change. Drawing on diverse 
perspectives from psychology, including protection motivation theory and the health 
belief model (Rogers, 1975, 1983), these authors advance a complex and integrative 
framework that attempts to build a predictive model, including factors such as direct 
and indirect experience with climate change, response appraisals, interpretive and 
motivational responses and cultural meaning systems. Taken together, this manifold 
set of ‘initial responses’ are argued to “influence each other as well as the selection of 
intra-individual and behavioural responses at both the individual and community levels, 
which in turn mediate individual and community impacts” (p. 280).  
Modelling psychological processes potentially implicated in ‘psychological adaptation’  
elucidates the cyclic and dynamic assemblage of meaning systems available to 
individuals when rationalising what they should do about climate change.  
Yet, one of the criticisms levelled at predictive models of risk perception has been that 
such an approach obfuscates some of the complex and contradictory ways that people 
attribute meaning to social phenomenon such as climate change (e.g. Joffe, 2003). 
Further, the development of monolithic theories of risk perception appear to take for 
granted that they can be applied to any cultural group, and will remain a reliable model 
for predicting behaviour across time and contexts. Further,   there is appears to be a 
propensity amongst some psychologists to focus on intra-individuals processes of 
‘psychological adaptation’ (e.g. Reser & Swim, 2011), whilst ignoring much the 
contents of people’s accounts for climate change and their coping responses, which 
seems to neglect an important research domain.   
1.1.1 The role of affect 
Early risk perception studies, as previously noted, broadly treated ‘perceivers’ as 
deliberative information processors, weighing up the risk characteristics of a particular 
risk domain before making their subjective risk judgments (Slovic, 2000). More recently 
however, the role of emotion, or more specifically ‘affect’, has been recognized as an 
important mediator of risk perceptions (Leiserowitz, 2005; Peters & Slovic, 1996; 
Slovic, 2000; 2010; Slovic, Finucane, Peters, & MacGregor, 2004; Sundblad, Biel, & 
Garling, 2007; Weber, 2010). Affect refers to relatively stable feelings of ‘goodness’ or 
‘badness’ about an idea, entity or image which can be summoned rapidly and 
automatically in response to stimuli (Leiserowitz, 2006). How one feels about a 
particular ‘thing’ can have significant effects on seemingly ‘rational’ judgements. Fiske 
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(1982) argues that some categories are characterised by a negative affective 
component, which can be elicited when this category is cued.  
For example, when perceivers are confronted with images of nuclear waste, or 
concepts of a noxious disease such as the Ebola Virus, they categorise and assimilate 
these notions to existing knowledge, and “evaluate the instance on the basis of the 
affect linked to the schema” (Fiske, 1982, p. 60). Thus, some risk domains can be 
characterised, and fundamentally perceived by their ‘affective tags’, or affective quality, 
which cue emotional processes that then influence ‘rational’ cognitive process (Zajonc, 
1980). 
Epstein (1994) has postulated the existence of two distinct, but interactive information 
processing systems: the ‘rational system’ and the ‘emotionally driven experiential 
system’. The rational system is characterised as a set of conscious, logical and 
analytical processes that are inherent features of what we would generally call 
‘intellect’. According to Epstein, the emotionally driven system is an all or nothing, rapid 
process that determines whether a stimulus is either pleasurable or painful. This 
system reliably makes broad generalisations that are slow to change, requiring 
concerted effort or intense experience. Abelson (1963) usefully conceived the 
metaphor of the ‘hot cognition’ to differentiate the emotional system from more 
deliberative, intellectual ‘cold cognitions’. 
Taking these insights on affect and its influence on deliberative thinking into the 
psychometric domain of risk perception, researchers have begun exploring how 
responses to environmental risk are also influenced by affect. A number of studies 
have demonstrated how affective feeling states, such as “goodness” or “badness”, 
predict risk perception for tangible, environmental threats. Slovic, Flynn and Layman 
(1992) asked participants to provide verbal imagery (Szalay & Deese, 1978) responses 
to the concept of a nuclear waste repository.  
Respondents were then asked to rate the ‘affective quality’ (extremely negative to 
extremely positive) of their imagery responses (i.e. ‘what are some images or words 
that come to mind when you think of a nuclear waste repository?’). These ratings were 
found to be predictive of their intended support for a ban on the repository. 
Similarly, Peters and Slovic (1996) have extended the ‘cognitive map’ explanation of 
risk perception to include ‘worldviews’ and ‘affect’ as predictive variables. Their results 
suggest that affect and worldviews both independently predict support for nuclear 
energy. That is, as respondents rated the stimulus term in increasingly negative ways, 
and as endorsement of egalitarian worldviews increased, the less likely respondents 
were to support the notion of nuclear energy. A study by Leiserowitz (2006) illustrated 
the role of affective and experiential factors on climate change risk assessments.  
American respondents were asked to affectively evaluate (holistically) ‘global warming’ 
(i.e. “do you have any negative or positive feelings about ‘global warming’’), and then 
rated the valence of these feelings. Furthermore, respondents were requested to 
provide affective images employing continued word associations, which were 
subsequently rated on a bi-polar affect scale. Both these measures, holistic, and 
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affective images (principally, the image of ‘naysayers’), were found to be significant 
predictors of climate change risk perception3 and policy preferences. Interestingly 
however, 62% of respondents associated global warming with “geographically and 
psychologically distal impacts” (Leiserowitz, 1996, p. 62). Although climate change risk 
was perceived as real and moderately concerning, negative affect and ‘egalitarian’ 
worldview orientations did not necessarily go hand-in-hand with a view that climate 
change constituted a ‘real’ threat closer to home, necessitating urgent mitigating and 
adaptation action.  
In Australia, scant attention has been paid to delineating affective factors involved in 
climate change risk perception. However, studies that have attempted to measure 
climate change risk perceptions in terms of these factors have yielded instructive 
results. Reser et al. (2012a) found that when respondents were asked ‘how concerned, 
if at all, are you about climate change...’, 66.3% of respondents stated they were either 
‘very concerned’ or ‘fairly concerned’. In Leviston and Walker’s (2011) study, around 
40% of respondents who believed that climate change was occurring were “somewhat 
worried” about climate change. Unsurprisingly, perhaps, those respondents who rated 
climate change as attributable to human activity also reported higher levels of worry 
and fear about how they would be affected in contrast to those who believed perceived 
climate change as a natural phenomenon. This finding echoes research conducted in 
the United Kingdom. O’Connor, Bord & Fisher (1999) found that belief in a human 
induced cause of climate change strongly predicted behavioural intentions to mitigate 
its risks.  
Moreover, a number of examinations have explored the role of images and their 
connotative affective meanings in the construction of climate change meaning 
(Nicolson-Cole. 2005; O’Neill & Hulme, 2009; Smith & Joffe, 2009, 2012). The power of 
visual images to render the notion of climate change ‘concrete’ is argued to be a “key   
vehicle of communication” (Smith & Joffe, 2012 p. 18). For example, O’Neill and Hulme 
(2009) found that certain “non-expert” representations, such as images and narratives 
that represented how sea-level rise would impact on a local environment, could 
effectively engage participants and stimulate further interest on the issue of climate 
change. 
Similarly, Smith and Joffe (2012), employing Social Representations Theory 
(Moscovici, 1978), demonstrated how participants invoked images readily available in 
the media, such as ‘melting glaciers’ to concretize climate change in meaningful and 
affective forms. These authors have highlighted the ‘dyadic’, vacillating nature of 
climate change representations as they are employed for sense making and 
communication purposes.      
In summary, an evolving literature suggests that emotion can play an important role in 
furnishing the idea of climate change as personally relevant, thus aiding in the process 
of public engagement (Moser & Dilling, 2007).  In particular, studies that employ word 
associations have explicated the connotative  meanings individuals give when asked to 
                                               
3
 In this study, socio-demographic and ‘worldview’ variables also significantly predicted risk 
perceptions.  
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think about a particular idea or phenomenon, without the need to have these meanings 
“...expressed in the full discursive structure of language” (Szalay & Deese, 1978. p. 9).  
Public perceptions of the threats posed by climate change are clearly bound up with 
representational systems that are imbued with affective meaning, and attempts to 
measure emotional salience and direction may provide important insights into 
subjective meaning systems relating to climate change risks not easily accessed by 
focusing on ‘rational’ systems of sense making. These insights are particularly 
instructive for public climate change engagement strategies. Psychological research 
has strongly suggested that emotionally laden information can concretize future events, 
and may engender action on climate change (e.g. Weber, 2006), However, according 
to Weber (2006), the deployment of affective messages that invoke visceral concern 
needs to be used strategically, as unintended ‘side-effects’ can induce 
counterproductive effects.  
For example, O’Neill and Nicholson-Cole (2009), in their qualitatively based study, 
argue that fear inducing and ‘drastic’ representations associated with climate change, 
such as “starving children” and “dried up lake with dead fish” may be effective in 
making the issue salient - in the short term - but had a deleterious effect on participants 
feelings of being able to do anything about the issue. Accordingly, what can be taken 
from this work is that catastrophic, large-scale representations may be effective in 
grabbing initial attention, but then may provoke a sense of despair, hopelessness and 
disengagement - and as Lorenzoni et al (2007) suggest - denial.  
According to O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole (2009), communications strategies that invoke 
affective representations should be attuned to individuals’ “personal points of 
reference” (p. 375), that is, their discrete values, understandings and kinds of everyday 
experiences and pressures of life. Indeed, a ‘bottom up’ approach to developing 
discrete communications interventions informs the current research. The evidence 
strongly suggests that an approach that considers how various publics imbricate the 
threat of climate change with their situated contexts can be an effective means by 
which to meaningfully engage communities (also see Moser & Dilling, 2004).  
1.1.2 Worldviews and socio-cultural determinates of risk perception 
In recent times, risk and climate change perception literature has highlighted important 
role of socio-cultural determinates, augmenting perspectives that focus on the study of 
mental and affective models (Dessai et al., 2004; Dunlap, 1998; McCright & Dunlap, 
2011; Peters & Slovic, 1996; Slovic, 2000). According to Dessai and colleagues risk 
perception is a function of interactions between external, technical definitions of risk, 
such as those emanating from government research facilities (i.e. CSIRO), and 
‘internal variables’, such as trust in the communicator, pre-existing personal 
‘worldview’s’, personal experience, and so forth.  
In other words, what constitutes dangerous risk is understood as not something that 
exists outside of the social – contrastingly, it is a value-linked perception, interacting 
with cultural and political processes, influencing the form and strength of how a risk is 
perceived (Kasperson et al., 1988).  
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As is most apparent in the a number of political milieus around the world, scientific 
climate change ‘risk signals’ (e.g. Dessai et al., 2004) are regularly distilled, attenuated 
and amplified through the media (Kasperson et a., 1988), and these risk narratives are 
divided and polarized in accordance with the worldview orientations of the 
disseminating news agency. In  Leviston and Walker’s (2011) study they found that 
those people who scored higher on pro-environmental behaviours were also more like 
to believe that climate change was happening and attributable to humans. Similarly, 
voting intentions were also correlated to pro-environmental behaviours. The Institute of 
Social Science Research at The University of Queensland also found that Australian 
politicians, dependant on their party political affiliations (Labor, Liberal/Nationals, 
Greens), had divergent beliefs about whether climate change was occurring, and 
whether is constituted a serious threat (ISSR, n.d.). 
In the United States, the influence of political orientation on climate change perceptions 
of has been examined by McCright and Dunlap (2011). Their study investigated 
differences between how Liberals/Democrats and Conservatives/Republicans voters 
viewed climate change (global warming in the US parlance), and to what extent the 
American public become polarised as a function of the observable cleavages between 
how party elites approach climate change. Unsurprisingly (and disheartening), clear 
differences were observed between ‘Democrat’ (65%) and ‘Republican’ (41%) voters 
when asked if they subscribe to the belief that ‘the effects of global warming have 
already begun to happen’.  
What the findings in Australia and the US suggest is that any attempt to moderate and 
‘inform’ beliefs about the risk associated with anthropogenic climate change will be, 
especially for those who endorse a ‘conservative’ political outlook, ineffective, without 
taking into consideration the wider, socially negotiated construals that risk becomes 
entwined with. As Dake (1992) has argued, the perception of risk is always biased in 
relation to how it serves the functional needs of social groups. That is, the reception of 
knowledge claims relating to climate change risk (especially since one of the 
foundations of modern industry has been the burning of fossil fuels) are mediated by 
the consequences these claims may have for maintaining a particular way of life. For 
example, for individuals who subscribe to worldviews that valorise individual rights and 
freedoms over the need for ‘big government’, the spectre of constraining tax regulation 
aimed at reducing CO2 emissions could be perceived as highly problematic. 
Alternatively, for those who hold egalitarian worldviews, a carbon tax, for example, may 
be considered as a wholly reasonable and equitable response that aligns with values of 
shared social responsibility and equality across society.  
Of course, people are more complex and less easily categorised than this, but political 
and worldview orientations are important antecedents when it comes to how people 
appraise climate change. As the previously noted studies utilising Cultural Theory 
(Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982) highlight, an individual’s ‘cultural bias’ can function as a 
powerful lens for interpreting risk signals communicated by scientists and policy 
makers, working to justify individual positions on climate change risk. Moreover, within 
an increasingly polarised debate, where media and political allegiances can be clearly 
cleaved into separate camps, it is conceivable that worldview polarization will continue 
to grow.  As the public follows media ‘balkanization’ (McCright & Dunlap, 2011), 
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selectively gathering their news from media outlets that support their views, their views 
may become more entrenched and difficult to mediate.  
Undoubtedly, then, the shape that climate change risk signals take, and their 
relationship to broader worldview narratives, plays a significant role in how climate 
change policy and risk communications are interpreted by social groups (Leiserowitz, 
2005; Lorenzoni et al.,2005).  
Although research that draws on Cultural Theory helpfully extends the psychometric 
approach to risk by emphasising that risk perception is intrinsically related to worldview 
beliefs, there are limitations in terms of how this research measures, and indeed, 
conceptualises such orientations. I contend that survey instruments and the tenants of 
Cultural Theory themselves do not provide the required definition and depth for 
examining how people rationalise their views on climate change risks. For example, 
Cultural Theory is criticised (see Marris, Langford & O’Roiden, 1998) for providing a 
simplistic representation of what it claims are four mutually exclusive ‘ways of life’ 
(worldviews). These worldview categories assume that people will slavishly act in 
accordance with their ‘innate’ worldview orientations in relation to most issues, 
independent of manifold contextual influences. This somewhat determinist approach is 
critiqued on the basis that people often are not ‘all or nothing’ thinkers on an issue, but 
hold ambivalent and at times, highly contradictory views (Billig et al., 1988; Marris et 
al., 1998).  
One way to elaborate on ‘worldview’ beliefs that does not reduce people to simple 
labels is to focus on social interactions where worldviews manifest while talking about a 
particular topic. As Marris et al. (1998) conclude, employing both qualitative (focus 
groups) and quantitative measures could usefully garner more detailed insights into 
how people account for their worldviews in relation to how, or if, these worldviews are a 
factor contributing to risk perception. The examination of ‘worldview’s in relation to 
climate change, as they appear ‘in-situ’, is clearly underexplored in the literature.  
1.1.2 Direct experience with climate change  
Personal experience has been associated with knowledge and concern about a 
particular risk, whilst being positively linked with mitigating behavioural responses (see 
Whitmarsh, 2008a for an overview).  Arguably, then, the notion of climate change risk 
often removed from direct experience and mediated by media representations is 
usefully characterised as a “weak signal” (O’Connor et al., 1999. p. 462). In other 
words, climate change impacts do not lend themselves without concerted cognitive 
effort to everyday perception and understanding. Weber (2006) maintains that because 
some people have not yet been exposed (or have not yet perceived to have been 
exposed) to climate change risks, its threat is communicated in statistical, abstract and 
future-laden terms. As such, the perception of risk is stripped of its emotional salience 
(affect), as we have just discussed, constitutes a variable long postulated to work as a 
powerful causal driver of protective behaviour (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980; Peters & Slovic, 
1996).  
Perception of climate change risk, then, may be related to an individual’s perception of 
their physical vulnerability, and how this vulnerability may be affectively primed. Brody, 
Zahran, Vediz, & Grover (2008) have explored how risk perception is mediated by 
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physical and geographical factors in the United States. In their study, Brody et al. 
sought to explore links between scientifically assessed vulnerability factors, such as 
sea-level rise, extreme heat, inland flooding and extreme weather, and perceived risk 
from climate change. Most notably, respondents who lived close to the coast were 
most overtly cognizant of the risks associated with climate change. Contrastingly, those 
who resided in floodplains; those at risk to extreme temperature; and those vulnerable 
to coastal storm and increased precipitation - all highly vulnerable groups - perceived 
significantly lower risk from climate change.  
For Brody and colleagues, this finding is partly explained by the strong association 
Americans have between climate change and sea level rise; those residing closer to 
the sea would perceive greater risk premised on a wider climate change discourse in 
the US.  
Interestingly however, Whitmarsh (2008a) found that individuals who had direct 
experience of flooding differed very little from other participants who not experienced 
flooding, with respects to their understanding and response to climate change. 
Furthermore, participants construed that direct experience of flooding was central to 
believing that flooding itself posed a serious risk, but saw climate change as a separate 
risk phenomenon. These findings highlight the non-linear relationship between ‘direct 
experience’ and how such experiences may be causally interpreted. As Whitmarsh 
contends, attributing blame for events like flooding is often contingent on the local 
decision making and political contexts operating within communities.  
1.1.3 Climate change and the Media 
The factors affecting risk perception are manifold, and because climate change is 
difficult to perceive directly, and closely interwoven with various social and political 
issues, its definition, scientific basis and impacts have been chiefly communicated 
through the media. In this way, scientific claims can be conceptualised as being 
‘represented’ by the media, and thus, mediated in accord with media values, 
commercial imperatives. news media notions of ‘balanced reporting’, topicality, and so 
forth (Boykoff & Boykoff, 2004; Carvalho, 2007). Whilst the media mediate and shape 
scientific knowledge, it also articulates public opinion, and is thus a key site for 
academic inquiry on public understandings of climate change (Carvalho & Burgess, 
2005).  A number of studies have examined how public opinion on climate change is 
socially constructed in the media, and to what extend social actors (politicians, 
scientists, business people, policymakers) utilise this medium to frame their knowledge 
claims on what is, or isn’t, ‘risky’ in relation to climate change.  
To explore the influence of ‘ideology’ in new reportage on climate change in the UK, 
Carvalho (2007) examined how three newspapers with varying political affiliations 
reconstructed scientific knowledge. Her examination evidences how certain scientific 
‘facts’ were interpreted by the various media outlets in concordance with their 
ideological positions. For example, The Times, a Conservative ‘quality’ newspaper, 
was shown to discredit those, like the IPCC, who made truth claims that threatened 
their own highly sceptical position. Conversely, The Independent and The Guardian, 
comparatively left-leaning news papers, conveyed risks associated with climate change 
as real, and highlighted the scientific consensus and certainly on the issue. 
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Politicians also play a central role in shaping representations of climate change risk 
through the media (Carvalho & Burgess, 2005). In an Australian study, Kurz, 
Augoustinos and Crabb (2010), employing discursive analysis, examined how the ALP 
and The Coalition deployed ‘rhetorical resources’ (Billig, 1987; Wetherell & Potter, 
1992) to argue for their particular policy positions on climate change. Although not 
related to the notion of ‘risk’ per se, mitigative responses to climate change were 
accounted for by both major parties by invoking rhetoric of ‘the national interest’ – 
premised on the basis of concern for the economic state of the nation. Moreover, 
climate change policy was accounted for in terms of ‘lifestyle maintenance’, which 
invoked concerns related to threats to normative understandings of “citizens’ rights to 
consume at will” (Kurz et al., p. 622). This study shows how climate change risk 
perceptions are made sense of within broader socio-political discourses, and without 
this contextualising background, analysis would lose some of its power to explain the 
phenomenon in detail.  
Empirical enquiry on climate change risk perception and adaption then, could consider 
employing qualitative methodologies that elucidate on what are an inherently dynamic 
set of factors, interwoven with manifold social discourses.  
For instance, how do people reconcile the modern day imperative for improving one’s 
‘lifestyle’, whilst being concerned about the effects of climate change (Lorenzoni, 
Nicholson-Cole & Whitmarsh, 2007)? How do individuals rationalise their lack of 
climate change adaptation planning, even if they purport to agree that climate change 
is ‘real’ phenomenon? These questions go to the heart of inquiries into how various 
publics can be ‘engaged’ with climate change; that is, how they feel, think and enact 
behaviours aimed at reducing the risks posed to them (Whitmarsh, O’Neill, & 
Lorenzoni, 2011).  
1.1.3 Engaging the pubic with climate change adaptation 
Public engagement is regularly enshrined as a key element in interventions that aim to 
limit the effects of climate change, foster community resilience, and build adaptation 
capacity (Few, Brown, & Tomkins, 2007; Gifford, 2011; Raynor & Malone, 1997). Yet, 
limited attention had been paid to better understanding behaviour change in relation to 
mitigation practices, and even less on adaptation practices  (O’Neill & Hulme, 2009; 
Whitmarsh et al., 2011) Whitmarsh and colleagues have argued that meaningful public 
engagement should not only be comprised of public education on the facts of climate 
change, its causes and its impacts, but should also be based on existing public 
knowledge, concerns, institutional relationships, and greater democratic opportunities 
to participate in policy development. Accordingly, one of the chief aims of the current 
research is to produce evidence that can provide much needed in-depth data from  
which to contextualise and inform public climate change adaptation communication and 
enragement strategies. 
 
Lorenzoni et al (2007) have defined public ‘engagement’ as “a state of engagement 
with the issue of climate change...concurrently comprising cognitive, affective and 
behavioural aspects” (p.446).That is to say, engagement encompasses more than 
simply knowing about climate change; it also comprises caring about it, whilst being 
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motivated and capable of enacting positive behaviours. A growing body of 
interdisciplinary work (e.g. Whitmarsh et al., 2011) has examined how diverse publics 
interact with climate change. For example, Gifford (2011) has collated a selection of 8 
core ‘psychological barriers’ to individual inaction, drawing on an array of psychological 
theories such as social comparison (e.g. Festinger, 1954) and ‘worldviews’ (e.g. Heath 
& Gifford, 2006). Yet, there is a paucity of research that examines how various 
communities engage with the various facets of adaptation, and how this interacts with 
their everyday understandings, values, routines and so on (Whitmarsh et al., 2011)  . 
Similarly, the development of climate change policy suffers from a lack of in-depth 
focus on how social groups - differentiated by place, exposure experience, social 
capital, adaptation beliefs, cultural values and social identity – make sense of climate 
change and the need to exercise adaption responses to its risks (Adger, Barnett, 
Chapin & Ellemor,, 2011; Whitmarsh, 2008a). 
1.2 Objectives 
Premised on the literature review, and the identified imperative to improve knowledge 
on public perception and sense making processes relative to climate change and 
adaptation, the present study’s overall objectives are encapsulated thus: 
 examine the sense-making and explanatory processes social actors engage in 
when orienting to the risks posed by climate change in South Australia; 
 examine the extent to which South Australian respondents associate degree of 
threat to risk domains; 
 examine respondents’ knowledge of adaptation practices; 
 explore potential barriers to adaptation. 
1.3 Study design, epistemology and tensions 
This study employs a sequential, exploratory, mixed methods approach (Crede & 
Borrego, 2012; Creswell, Plano Clark, Gutmann, & Hanson, 2003; Creswell, & 
PlanoClark, 2007) comprising a qualitative, focus group phase, followed by a 
quantitative/qualitative survey. Observations and insights derived from the focus 
groups inform and contextualise the survey instrument. The decision to employ a 
pluralist design is premised on the notion that both methodologies will allow for a more 
multifaceted exploration into the nature of climate change perception and 
understanding (Tashakkori & Teddlie, 2003).  
 
It is important to acknowledge at this juncture that the methodological approach 
employed in the current project, combining discursive analysis (social constructionist: 
e.g. Gergen, 1998) and a quantitative survey methodology, is laden with 
epistemological tension which has long been the subject of contestation (i.e. “Paradigm 
wars”) in the social sciences (See Gage, 1989; Teddlie & Tashakkori, 2003).). Both 
methodologies carry with them different epistemological assumptions relating to how 
two forms of data sets can be interpreted, and especially, to what degree they are 
genralizable to the broader population. These tensions also run through the current 
research. The central question here relates to how well the qualitative and quantitative 
research findings can be coherently integrated, or related to each other, to allow for a 
coherent comprehension of the phenomenon (Erzberger & Kelle, 2003).  
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It is our view that a mixed-methods approach can, and should (for the creation of new 
insights) generate complementary, divergent or discrete findings, affording a more 
holistic analytic picture of the phenomenon under examination.  For example, the 
qualitative focus group methodology does not unproblematically allow for broad 
generalisations to be made about the prevalence of discursive themes in the wider 
population (it is also important to note that discursive psychology conceptualises 
‘generalizability’ against a very different set of epistemic assumptions e.g. Goodman, 
2008)What the qualitative component allows for is an inductive and exploratory 
examination into some of the sense making resources available to participants. When 
possible, the operationalization and quantitative analysis of discursive themes (i.e. 
‘temporal distancing’ of climate change) is carried out in the survey, allowing for more 
generalizable inferences to be made. Moreover, the analytic task of quantifying 
degrees of perceptual difference between climate change risk domains is obviously, 
not well suited to qualitative, ethnographic methodologies, as there is no quantification 
instrument (survey scale) that can meaningfully enable comparison between responses 
(Morse, 2003).  
 
The ‘theoretical drive’ (Morse, 1991) of this project can be described as fundamentally 
inductive. This exploratory focus is especially relevant to the focus group study, but 
also undergirds the survey study. This methodology does not preclude an exploration 
of some of the important cognitive-psychological theories identified in the broader 
literature , but since the core research question is focused on the examination of the 
contents of public understanding of climate change, a predictive theoretical focus is not 
apposite. 
The descriptive theoretical drive, informed by the literature review, is derived from a 
commitment to complement cognitive-psychological research with a qualitative and 
‘contents’ focus, delineating how social actors make meaning out of climate change 
(e.g. Joffe, 2003).   
More specifically, the two research methodologies meet the research objectives in the 
following ways: 
 
1. Semi-Structured focus groups. 
 
Focus groups afford a relatively ‘naturalistic’ (e.g. the researcher playing less of a role 
in biasing responses) means of gathering fine-grained data required to examine the 
sense-making practices of individuals. Respondents’ responses are not aggregated or 
grossly categorised; and thus, data more closely reflects the richness of individuals’ 
understandings of the relevant phenomenon, and captures the nuance of respondents’ 
lived experience. Qualitative data also enables analysis of the inherent dilemmas (see 
Billig, 1987) and paradoxes imbued in the psychological processes of responding to 
complex social issues such as climate change. Inferences gleaned from qualitative 
analysis can be highly effective in informing strategies for engaging communities. 
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2. Quantitative/qualitative survey instrument 
The survey instrument aims to quantify, with a representative sample, the degree of 
threat domain appraisal; explore images associated with climate change and 
associated affective responses; and measure adaptation knowledge. The survey 
instrument is intended to partially complement the focus group data when possible, 
allowing descriptive statistical analysis to be conducted that further bears out salient 
themes. 
1.4 Overview of the structure of this report 
As noted, two studies constitute this research, and for the sake of brevity, simplicity 
and coherence, this report will be structured from this point in two sections, with 
discrete methodological, results-discussion sections respective to the two studies. An 
overall conclusion will follow these sections, discussing limitations and potential 
research opportunities emerging from the current research.  
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2. THE FOCUS GROUPS 
2.1 Focus group sampling and recruitment procedure 
Four semi-structured focus-groups were conducted in the South Australian cities of 
Port Adelaide, Noarlunga, Mount Gambier and Whyalla. Twenty-two participants (12 
females and 10 males), ranging from 18 to 64 years, were recruited via numerous 
methods; including ‘snowballing’, newspaper advertising, flyers in local libraries, 
interest group email listings and local Facebook pages. Participants’ ‘self-selected’ in 
response to these recruitment strategies, and all participants over 18 who contacted 
the researcher (first author) were accepted. A small ($25) ‘thankyou’ gift voucher was 
used to encourage potential participants. Participant breakdown for each focus group 
are as follows:  
 Port Adelaide: 3 Females, 4 Male  
 Onkaparinga: 4 Female, 2 Male 
 Mount Gambier: 4 Female, 2 Male 
 Whyalla: 3 Male 
On first contact, the researcher (first author) explained the details and general aim of 
the study, and took contact and demographic details. Potential participants were further 
asked a preliminary question to participants’ about their general endorsement of the 
claim that climate change constituted a ‘real’ phenomenon. This question intended to 
assist in gauging the degree to which the participants may engage in debate on the 
truth status of climate change, and to prepare accordingly. However, all participants 
stated that they ‘believed in’ climate change to some degree or another.  
 
At this juncture, it should be underlined that the research question pertaining to the 
focus groups was not to investigate the beliefs, opinions and knowledges of individuals 
who could be categorised as holding ‘sceptical’ views on the veracity of climate change 
knowledge claims. Rather, the aim of the focus groups was to analyse how a self-
selected sample made sense of and rationalised climate change in their own words.  
 
Thus, the sampling procedures for this study did not aspire to recruit a stratified or 
representative sample on the basis of climate change ‘belief’ - but rather, to explore 
participants’ accounts of how climate change presented risks to themselves and their 
families, and what could be done to mollify these risks now and into the future.  
Patently, it would be difficult to sustain the argument that the focus group data linearly 
represents the views of populations in the same way quantitative methods claim to do. 
However, as Goodman (2008) has argued, the problem of generalizability (which, is not 
a problem unique to qualitative methodologies: see Edwards, 1997; Potter & Wetherell, 
1987) can be attacked from a number of angles. One way to generalize discursive 
findings it to conduct further studies to explore how discursive strategies are produced 
in different contexts The process of accumulating repeated observations of discursive 
patterns, employed by an array of speakers across different contexts can be, thus, 
used to sustain claims of generalizablity (Goodman, 2008).  
 
To be clear, it is not asserted that the qualitative study’s findings, by themselves, are 
generalizable – rather, when taken together with consonant theories (e.g. 
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‘psychological distancing’, Spence, Poortinga, & Pidgeon, 2012) and replicated  in 
different contexts, then qualitative findings could be considered generalizable 
(Goodman, 2008). 
 
In consultation with the South Australian Department of Environment, Water and 
Natural Resources (DEWNR), four focus groups locations were identified and selected 
on the basis that participants in these location may hold, due to their distinct social and 
geographical settings, a range of understandings pertaining to how climate change 
may impact on them and their communities. For example, we rationalised that those 
who resided in an area bordering on a gulf (such as Port Adelaide), may appraise their 
exposure to risk, and associated vulnerability, differentially to those who lived inland 
(e.g. Mount Gambier). In other words, it was expected that risk perceptions and 
adaptation responses would be notionally framed by participants’ physical location and 
relative experiences (Brody et al., 2008). 
2.2 Conducting the focus groups 
The focus groups were conducted in private meeting rooms within local libraries. All 
participants upon arrival were greeted then provided with information-consent and 
complaint forms, outlining the aim of the broad aims and scope of the study and their 
ethical obligations and rights. 
 
The interview utilised open–ended questions, designed to facilitate interaction between 
participants, and minimise moderator influence. One of the methodological advantages 
of focus groups is they recurrently furnish data that could not be yielded with one on 
one interviews or surveys (Wilkinson, 1998). The interactive nature of focus groups and 
the analytic privileging of participants own meanings in subsequent analysis, enables 
crucial phenomenological insights into people’s ‘lifeworlds’ (Wilkinson, 1998). For 
example, focus groups have been instrumental in identifying barriers and objections 
that attenuate the efficacy of health-related communications, such as AIDS prevention 
messages (Kitzinger, 1990). Indeed, focus groups are well honed to answering 
research questions that examine individuals’ lay-representations, common-sense 
beliefs and experiential understandings, within a social context that facilitates individual 
disclosure and the co-production of meaning (Wilkinson, 1998). For the current study, 
then, the interactive, co-production of meaning is described and analysed, because it is 
within this context that participant’s utterances are oriented to, and attending to these 
processes can provide important insights into the social nature of how climate change 
understandings are accepted, rebutted and negotiated. 
2.3 Focus group questions 
The semi-structured focus groups questions were constructed for the purposes of this 
study, and collaboratively designed with the research team to promote informality 
(within the parameters of the research aims) and participant directed discussion (see 
Putcha & Potter, 2004).     
The focus group questions varied slightly across focus groups, but can be 
encapsulated in the following forms:  
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1) Do you see a risk to yourself and your community from climate change? 
If so, how might this risk affect your community, and how probable is it?  
2) What do you do, or what could you do in the future, to cope with the 
threats associated with climate change?   
All focus groups were audio and video recorded and transcribed verbatim by a 
professional transcription service, and names changed to anonymise participants. 
Transcripts were subsequently read and re-read whilst listening to the audio recordings 
by the first author. A further iterative process of close-reading and re-reading of the 
data indentified recurrent linguistic constructions, and these extracts were removed 
from the text and coded together under general themes. 
Further readings of the transcripts were conducted in light of these emergent themes, 
and variations on these themes were added to coding categories. Interpretation of the 
segments of themed data were further analysed to identify how participants 
constructed climate change risk and adaptation responses. This procedure can be 
usefully described as a series of increasingly complex analytic iterations, which 
ultimately lead to the formation of hypotheses about the contents and function of the 
relevant understandings of climate change. The discursive themes identified and 
analysed in this study have been selected upon the basis of their joint prevalence and 
salience, or their ‘keyness’ (Braun & Clarke, 2006). That is to say, when identifying 
meaningful patterns of participants’ meaning (themes), analysis sought to consider 
both the frequency of the theme (prevalence) in the data set, and the meaningfulness 
(salience) of the noted theme. This joint basis for considering what is, and what is not a 
theme (and related sub-themes), is essentially made on the basis of how well the 
theme captures something meaningful about the data in relation to the research 
questions detailed above. 
2.4 Analytic approach 
The following analysis applies Discourse Analysis (DA) (Burr, 1995; Potter & Wetherell, 
1987; Wetherell & Potter, 1992) to examine how language ‘constructs’ climate change 
risk and adaptation practices, and how these constructs are variably depicted with 
discursive framings. DA a widely employed qualitative research tool within the domains 
of social psychology and sociology, and is essentially a method for identifying patterns, 
or themes, within a qualitative corpus of data. DA can be characterised as privileging 
language and text as the most appropriate analytical site for better understanding how 
social phenomena are made sense of. This approach presupposes an epistemology 
that treats particular versions of reality as ‘produced’ by the discursive practices of 
individuals and collectives, but also accepts that people make sense of their reality 
within the material limits of their physical world (Wiggins & Potter, 2008). For DA, the 
‘perceived reality’ of climate change risk is not provided by the phenomenon itself, 
‘read off’ its unique features; rather, it is linguistically ‘constructed’ from a stock of 
socially derived discursive resources from which people draw upon when making 
sense of any phenomena or entity. 
  
Although DA treats language is treated as central to the production of meaning, it does 
not deny that people engage cognitive and affective process when making sense of 
phenomena (this would be particularly odd claim to make). Although there are clearly 
internal cognitive processes at work, DA and rhetorical psychology holds that these are 
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inaccessible to the researcher. DA considers language and its practice as analogous, 
but observable, to thinking, and thus an apposite analytic site for observing and 
analysing the processes and contents of how natural and social phenomena and 
entities are categorised, contested and construed (e.g. Billig, 1987).  
 
DA, then, can be employed in ways that not only explicates the inherent complexity of 
human thinking, but moreover, produce findings can have important implications for 
climate change policy development and design of communication strategies. Indeed, 
such an approach is sensitive to the multiple ways that risk can be constructed, and 
can thus be used to generate important insights into how individuals orient to actions 
that could protect them from dangers from a changed climate.  
 
In summary, the discursive analytic approach utilised here is concerned with revealing 
individuals’ sense-making practices when considering climate change risk and 
adaptation. By focusing on the ‘language of risk’ (Joffe, 2003), this analysis can inform 
policy responses that resonate with current understandings and socio-cultural and  
material contexts relevant for South Australian communities. Lorenzoni & Pidgeon 
(2006, p. 90) allude to this social focus thus: 
 
If the future of climate change rests on moral, ethical and value judgements, in 
which citizens will be called upon to decide and take action, then it is important 
to recognise that different degrees of knowledge, cultural preferences, 
responsibility and trust will all shape an individuals’ position on the issue.  
 
If climate change is partially understood in terms of broader social understandings, 
then at least some empirical attention should be positioned at this level of analysis, 
explicating the multi-faceted and intrinsically social nature of climate change as it is 
produced in language, and how it functions to constrain or advance individual, social 
and political action on climate change.  
2.5 Focus group findings and discussion 
The following analysis examines how participants in four focus groups understand 
climate change ‘risk’ and adaptive responses. In particular, this analysis focuses on 
how such understandings are shaped and qualified in reference to normative meanings 
employed to explain the nature of climate change and its risks.   
 
It should be made clear at this juncture that the following analysis analyses talk that 
has been produced by participants for a specific social context: a focus group. As with 
any social interaction, talk where interlocutors are attempting to make sense of a 
phenomenon, attempting to persuade, are implicitly attending to various rhetorical, 
epistemic and social challenges (e.g. Potter, 1996). Thus, throughout the following 
analysis we accept that speakers are, in formulating their accounts of climate change, 
managing numerous interactional issues in accord with imperatives of this context. This 
is especially pertinent in the broader context of climate change as a ‘controversial’ and 
contested topic, often associated with worldview and political orientations. Participants 
were aware of the potential for contestation, and many ‘hedged’ their accounts with 
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‘disclaimers’ (Hewitt & Stokes, 1975) that functioned to protect their opinions from 
potential criticism (e.g. ‘this is just my opinion’) (Potter & Wetherell, 1987). 
The analysis also employs the concept of ‘frames’ to examine participants’ ways of 
making sense of climate change. Very generally, frames can be defined as: 
“frames organize central ideas, defining a controversy to resonate with core 
values and assumptions. Frames pare down complex issues by giving 
some aspects greater emphasis. They allow citizens to rapidly identify why 
an issue matters, who might be responsible, and what should be done” 
(Nisbet & Mooney, 2007, p. 56).  
In this analysis, three overarching discursive ‘frames’ were discerned and categorised 
thus: 
i) Distancing climate change 
ii) ‘Seeing is believing’: invoking ‘evidence’ for climate change 
iii) The problem with adaptation 
2.5.1 Distancing Climate change 
Temporal framing of climate change: A risk for future generations 
How do individuals make sense of an environmental threat whose evidence is most 
often not directly experienced, but is usually based on statistical descriptions, or media 
representations of climate science, depicting it’s manifestation in the long-term future, 
or spatially distant places?  
The ‘psychological distance’ (e.g. Bord et al., 1998; Leiserowitz, 2005; Moser & Dilling, 
2004; Spence et al., 2012; Spence, Poortinga, Butler, & Pidgeon, 2011; Uzzell, 2000; 
Weber, 2010) of climate change, spatially, temporally, or personally (a risk to others, 
but not yourself), has been argued to constitute a significant barrier to ‘risk perception’ 
and public action on climate change. In the following section we evidence and analyse 
how participant’s bring to bear understandings of climate change that are either 
principally relevant to future generations, or lacking in salience in contrast to the 
challenges of everyday life. 
The construction of climate change as a temporally distant threat, as posing serious 
risk in medium to long-term timeframes, was observed in different formulations across 
all focus groups. The forms that these temporal constructions took were often relevant 
to participants’ various descriptions and rationalisations for why climate change was, or 
was not, a clear and present danger.  
In the first extract, Shane (Mount Gambier), who owns a house ‘on the beach’, provides 
a rationale for his decision to purchase in this location. 
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Extract 1. 
 
 
In this extract Shane explains that although he knows - by carrying out ‘a projection’ 
(line 60) - that sea-level rise related to climate change will eventually threaten his 
property, this prospect will not be encountered until he is eighty. Shane notes that he 
has already observed the process manifesting in the form of ongoing erosion of a track 
behind his property. However, the projection of sea level rise and current observations 
are not interpreted to present a direct threat in their ‘lifetime’ (line 76); instead, sea level 
rise will pose serious challenges to his children in theirs.  
 
What is notable in this extract is how sea-level rise is framed as a problem that, 
although conceived as ‘real’, is ultimately accounted for as an incremental, slow 
moving phenomenon, especially in the context of the risk it poses to Shane’s property. 
This rationalisation is understandable.  
Sea-level rise is often represented in climate science (e.g. IPCC, 2007), and in the 
media, as a slow moving phenomenon, gradually flooding low-lying areas, especially 
small islands in geographically distant regions.  
 
Moreover, projected risks posed by inundation from the sea are often associated with 
time-frames outside of many Australians’ expected life-span i.e. ‘2100’ (Houston, 
2012); and in the physical sciences, sea level rise projections are regularly quantified 
on time-scales that are not germane to the short-term pressures and interests of 
individuals (e.g. IPCC, 2007). Thus, as a number of participants elucidated, the threat 
of adverse affects from sea inundation is partially rationalised by a lack of temporal 
salience. 
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Similarly, temporal risk framings were employed by participants living in Port Adelaide, 
an area also understood as highly vulnerable to inundation from the sea (DCCEE, 
2011). 
 
Extract 2. 
 
 
In this extract, sea-level rise is constructed as a serious threat, but is mediated as a 
distant, suspended risk, due to the length of time the sea takes to ‘rise five metres’ (line 
371). Consequently, it is argued that although ‘current generations’ (line 369-70) need 
to ‘anticipate events’ (line 368), serious flooding will essentially confront future 
generations. 
 
The above extracts could be construed as exemplifying a lack of psychological salience 
associated with the representation of sea-level rise, as promulgated in the scientific 
literature, and selectively re-represented in the popular media (e.g. The Age, 2012). 
The discursive construction of a lagging, temporally distant sea-level rise, arguably 
abrogates alternative, salient representations of sea-level rise, such as so-called 
‘storm-surges’ which can be potentially linked to current experience, even if such 
‘experiences’ are discerned vicariously via the media.  
 
Interestingly, locating the adverse effects of climate change in distant future was 
problematised by some participants, and they dissected this logic to formulate a theory 
on why climate change was not being treated seriously. 
 
Extract 3. 
 
 
In Mary’s account above, scepticism and ‘knowledge’ deficits prevent people from 
conceiving climate change as a dangerous phenomenon. Suzy then chips in with her 
own hypothesis, contending that climate change is generally understood as a 
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phenomenon that will occur after ‘their time’ (line 579). Gail and Lydia in their 
subsequent turns, build upon this hypothesis, and Lydia employs a discursive device 
called ‘active voice’ (Wooffitt, 1992. p. 171) to sum up, ironically, how this logic runs: 
‘well I’m going to be dead by then’ (line 582-83), and subsequently provides an account 
that frames climate change as a ‘continuing process’ (line 586). 
We can see in this extract how speakers orient to and attempt to undermine the 
temporal distancing logic observed here and in previous extracts. 
 
What is particularly noteworthy is the way Lydia attempts to reshape the implicit 
assumption that the risk associated with climate change is one that will only present in 
the future. Constructing climate change as a ‘process’, instead of a hazard that will 
abstrusely materialise in the distant future, arguably functions to bring such risks closer 
to the present time and lives of individuals. As previously noted, Spence at al. (2012) 
have argued that the backgrounding of climate change as an intangible, abstract, and 
‘psychologically distant’ threat constitutes a serious obstruction to public engagement 
and action. Conversely, direct experience of climate change it is contended, would 
promote emotional and cognitive engagement, “making the benefits of acting on 
climate change more tangible” (Spence et al., 2012 p. 959). Interestingly, however, for 
a number of focus group participants, constructing climate change as a temporally 
distant risk did not necessary negate worry about its impacts, but instead, 
corresponded with concerns for future generations, especially participants’ children and 
grandchildren. 
 
Extract 4. 
 
 
Although climate change is represented as manifesting in ‘fifty years time’ (line 577), it 
invariably remains a concern for this participant (who is in his 60’s) on behalf of his 
grandchildren. What is more, this concern for his grandchildren is magnified, because 
his own children are not considered to hold a similar worry for their own children. What 
is observable in this segment, and more discernable in terms of the affective valence 
(as represented in the recording) of this participant’s talk, is the weight of 
intergenerational concern being displayed. 
 
The notion that climate change seriously threatens the life quality of future generations 
is widely reflected in institutional discourses (Page, 2006). For example, The United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) enshrines the following 
principle (3.1):  
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Parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future 
generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their 
common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.  
 
Similarly, in Australia, the Federal Minister for Climate Change and Energy Efficiency, 
Greg Combet (2011), has outlined the Australian Federal government’s approach to 
climate change in a speech titled ‘Acting now on climate change for future generations’:  
 
By acting now, Australians can look forward to long-term prosperity, while 
protecting our environment for ourselves, for our children and for future 
generations. 
Thus, it is worth briefly considering at this juncture how an ‘intergenerational 
responsibility argument’, invoking notions of entitlement and justice, could function to 
motivate individuals and communities to take action on climate change adaptation and 
mitigation. According, notions of ‘justice’ can effectively compel individuals to consider 
acting on behalf of others. We argue that for at least some participants in our focus 
groups who represented the impacts of climate change as transpiring after the end of 
their own lives, an intergenerational concern constituted a meaningful way of 
understanding these risks.  
 
Climate change is a long-term process, and future generations will bear a 
disproportionate share of the impacts (IPCC, 2007). We pose that for those individuals 
who already hold worldviews that emphasise ethical and moral concerns for their 
children and grandchildren, appeals to intergenerational equity may compel them to act 
on climate change - even if they do frame the risks it poses as fundamentally set into 
the future.  
2.5.1.1 Psychological distancing – Climate change Vs Everyday concerns  
Climate change, although often rated in surveys as a ‘concern’, is comparatively 
ascribed less salience when compared to other social issues, such as cost of living, the 
economy, and employment (Ashworth et al., 2011). Similarly, in the current study, a 
number of participants discursively constructed climate change as lacking salience  
due to its deference to the more ‘immediate’ demands and pressures of everyday life. 
The following interaction exemplifies how a logic is deployed to explicate why climate 
change does not present as a more pressing problem. 
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Extract 5. 
 
We see in this extract how speakers, in interaction, engage in setting out a variable 
account for why climate change does not present to people as a more pressing issue. 
Cheryl, elaborating on the general claim by Xavier that the issue is ‘hard to get people 
on...’ (line 1318), uses the previously noted temporal distance explanation to frame the 
issue. Notably, Victoria further expands the account, noting that ‘there are so many 
other important...’ (line 1322-23), and this utterance is finished for her by Xavier, who 
through his referencing of life concerns, such as ‘paying for the mortgage’ (line 1324), 
agrees with Victoria, depicting risk from a changing climate ranks under a number of 
other seemingly more tangible concerns. 
 
At this juncture, Ritika takes a different explanatory tack (line 1331), noting that 
‘projections’ relevant to climate change are ambiguous, and thus, implicitly, 
problematic. The ‘not exact’ quality of the ‘numbers’ (line 1329) represents the science 
behind climate change as equivocal and nebulous - and importantly, aligns with Ritika’s 
position on climate change adaptation and preparedness. Indeed, Ritika is heard to be 
sceptical of action to ‘come up with solutions to prevent and protect before it starts 
happening’ (line 1332-34), but ultimately discerns some ‘sense’ (line 1335) in having 
adaptation ‘options sitting there waiting to go’ (line 1337). 
 
This extract speaks to the challenging nature of communicating the science of climate 
change in ways where the overall message is not obfuscated - or worse, employed as 
an exemplar for why it is simply not worth worrying about. What is part and parcel to 
climate change science; that is, some degree of uncertainty, reflecting the inherent 
difficulty in predicting how complex systems will interact to produce climate, can, for 
some individuals, be synonymous with ‘uncertain science’, that can function to absolve, 
justify or moderate the need for action. 
 
The next extract further illustrates how the issue of climate change loses-out when 
competing for attention alongside challenges relating to the grist of everyday existence. 
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Extract 6.  
  
In Brett’s account, the urgency of climate change is contrasted with what’s ‘happening 
in the share market’ (line 568-69), and the impact of this on Brett’s income. Although he 
is ‘thinking about it’ (line 568) - and it is clear that this participant does ‘believe’ in 
climate change - other fundamental concerns about his financial position are 
constructed as taking precedence in what is deemed urgent. Further, this account 
develops a more generalisible contention that ‘most people look at climate change’ 
(line 576-77) in terms of how the ‘gas tax’ (carbon tax) affects ‘jobs, money and 
lifestyle’ (line 586-87).  
 
Again, what we contend this extract illustrates is how climate change, as a social 
construct, does not exist in an isolated vacuum - but rather, is indexed against, and 
interlaced with political understandings and associated concerns about the cost of 
living. Indeed, it is hard to ignore the echoes of media representations in this account. 
In particular, the Federal government’s ‘carbon tax’ has been prominently associated 
with climate change in the media, and it is arguable that the controversy over the 
carbon tax had, for a time, supplanted the reasoning behind its introduction. 
 
It is unsurprising, then, that when people are offered the opportunity to speak about 
climate change, their talk is enmeshed within a wider narrative of sense making, and 
how this sense making is often drawn from media discourses and the social realm 
more generally. 
2.5.1.2 Summary 
What the extracts in this section elucidate is the somewhat ambivalent orientation 
some people hold towards climate change. As Leiserowitz (2006) has argued, this 
constitutes a paradox, in that although laypeople generally perceive the risks 
associated with climate change, when these are bracketed against the daily requisites 
of living, climate change slides down the echelon of priorities. What can be coined a 
‘salience deficit’ resonates with previous research conducted in other Western 
countries (Leiserowitz, 2005; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Portinga & Pidgeon, 2003; Spence 
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& Pidgeon, 2010; Whitmarsh et al., 2011), which generally characterise climate change 
as a ‘back burner’ issue.  
 
It is unsurprising, then, in the context of competing lifestyle concerns and a climate 
science struggling to effectively translate climate projections into digestible forms, that 
anthropogenic climate change may be acknowledged, but this recognition does not 
necessarily drive adaptive and mitigative action.  
 
These insights point to the need for the development of communication strategies that 
integrate climate change into the mix of daily concerns in forms that highlight its acute 
relevance to meaningful imperatives of daily life. The variable framing of climate 
change into segmented framings is one possible avenue for positively engaging 
heterogeneous publics with different values and imperatives (Nisbet & Mooney, 2007). 
Collective norms and values around, for instance, intergenerational ethics; the value of 
local natural ecosystems; the benefits associated with mitigation and adaptation (or 
‘gain framing’ e.g. Spence & Pidgeon, 2010); or religious beliefs can be, notionally, 
enrolled to construct effective communications, whilst stimulating positive behavioural 
responses. Mobilizing various publics, it seems, will take a multifaceted communication 
effort, appealing to a range of pre-existing individual and community interests and 
values, whist concomitantly overcoming some of the fatalism and political 
disenfranchisement inherent in some sectors of the polity (Ockwell, Whitmarsh, & 
O’Neill, 2009).    
2.5.2 ‘Seeing is believing’: invoking ‘evidence’ for climate change 
In the previous section, we examined extracts featuring discourses that framed climate 
change risks as psychologically distant. Some focus group participants, however, 
advanced claims that they held experiential evidence for climate change, and invoked 
observational memories, whilst making comparisons to past weather and other natural 
phenomena. ‘Climate change’ does not lend itself to direct observation in the daily 
weather; the phenomenon is ostensibly a reference to changes in average global 
temperatures over long timeframes, quantified through complex statistical 
measurement and predictive modelling (Spence et al., 2011).  
 
Hence, the notion of climate change is inherently abstract for most non-climate 
scientists, and has led to research that examines the idea that direct, personal 
experience of weather events linked to climate change can lead to changes in 
environmental views (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Spence & 
Pidgeon, 2010; Spence et al., 2012; Whitmarsh, 2008a). The following extracts 
explicate how participants went about constructing such accounts, and the various 
forms of experiential ‘evidence’ deployed to warrant claims that climate change was a 
meaningful risk confronting  them and their community.  
 
We focus on these framings because they provide important insights into the ways 
people rely on past events to ‘perceive’ climate change, and how these accounts are 
employed as analogues for envisaging and planning for future impacts from climate 
change. The first extract is taken from the focus group conducted in Mount Gambier, 
and the researcher has asked Bev for her opinion on what climate change will look like. 
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Extract 7. 
 
 
A feature of this extract is the referencing of ‘extreme weather’ (line 293) as a 
manifestation of climate change, and the means by which Bev provides a case in point 
to support this claim. Interestingly, this choice of exemplar, a ‘little tornado’ (line 293-
94) - a distinctive and ‘extreme’ weather event - causing serious damage to the South 
Australian township of Penola in 2010, does important work in constructing her claim. 
By selecting this vivid event (the term ‘ripped’ also does much descriptive and 
rhetorical work here), instead of, for example, a heat wave - something Australians 
have become historically accustomed to - this example arguably functions in a 
compelling fashion. The imagery and ‘unreal’ nature associated with a rare weather 
event such as a tornado provides climate change with an impact that can be clearly 
differentiated from ‘normal’, historically experienced weather patterns such as heat 
waves. 
 
In the next extract, two participants from the Onkaparinga focus group discuss how 
climate change is affecting the weather. 
 
Extract 8. 
 
 
In this extract, Mary claims that the weather ‘is different’ (line 73), and ‘is not your 
normal pattern’ (line 73-74), and like Bev in the previous extract, provides a case in 
point: referencing the ‘extreme heat we are having now in this week’ (line 74-76), and 
invoking a report: ‘in the paper, it is the hottest autumn they have had in x amount of 
years’ (line 76-78).  
Gail provides a similar example of how climate change is affecting the weather; 
however, her claim that the days are staying hotter, ‘like 4, 5 o’clock’ (line 82), are 
contrasted with weather recollected from her ‘schooldays’ (line 80) (this participant is 
now middle aged). 
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Similarly, deploying historical weather comparisons as evidence for climate change 
was observed in the Whyalla focus group, as the following extract shows. 
 
Extract 9. 
 
  
For the participants in the Whyalla discussion, a function of climate change was an 
appreciable change in humidity and moisture, and a ‘greener’ (line 462) landscape. 
Interestingly, it is not scientific ‘facts’ that are utilised to discuss the impact of climate 
change - rather, ‘first-hand’, experiential and historically framed evidence is drawn 
upon to argue that the climate is changing, and, importantly, is manifest in the present.  
 
The next extract comes from the focus group in Port Adelaide, where the risk from sea 
level rise is generally considered as one of the major threats to the city from climate 
change over the next 100 years.  
 
Extract 10. 
 
 
Again, what is notable in Alice’s account is how evidence for climate change is derived 
from her observations of actual flooding events. Moreover, Alice argues that Port 
Adelaide, even without the effects of climate change, was vulnerable to flooding, and 
paints an evocative picture of past flooding events, communicating a salient, and 
affectively laden analogue for what may be in store for the city.  
 
Similarly, other Port Adelaide participants framed their understanding of climate change 
risks in reference to first-hand experiences of flooding. 
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Extract 11. 
 
Although ‘large scale, long-term inundation’ (line 402) is not conceived as something 
likely to occur in Cheryl’s lifetime, she nevertheless understands that one of the 
negative upshots of climate change is more frequent flooding from ‘storm surge events’ 
(line 405). What is interesting and instructive about this account is how a distant, long-
term threat is reformulated into an extant, and thus, putatively salient risk. By 
fashioning a representation of flooding as manifesting on different time scales, this 
depiction manages to differentiate between a long-term risk - which is putatively difficult 
to imagine - and a current risk that has been linked to evocative images and events. 
Similar to extract 10, first-hand exposure to flooding notionally ‘grounds’ this account in 
the ‘imaginable’, and thus, notionally, renders it meaningful, salient and tangible. 
 
Further, for some participants, a dearth of direct experience and emotional connection 
with climate change explained why it did not present as a more urgent issue. 
 
Extract 12. 
 
 
For Brett, the incremental and slow-moving nature of climate change is responsible for 
inaction on climate change. Qualifying climate change as lacking a requisite ‘emotional 
event’ for it to registered as a ‘risk’, clearly accords with other framings already 
discussed; that is, if climate change is to be discerned as a risk necessitating a 
response from individuals and local communities, it needs to be understood as 
presenting a serious, clear and present danger to something salient within, and valued 
by, the community (e.g. ‘cafe at the foreshore’, line 90) 
Public understanding of climate change and adaptation in South Australia 
 
36 
The next extract fleshes-out this theme, as the participants in Mount Gambier engage 
in a rare contestation over whether climate change can be explained within the context 
of ‘cyclical’ (natural) weather patterns observed throughout history. 
 
Extract 13. 
 
At line 104, Bev challenges the representation of recent weather phenomena as 
indicative of ‘normal cycles’ and ‘fluctuations’ observed over ‘history’ (line 205-06), 
which generally comprises an anti-anthropogenic explanation for climate change. In a 
very rare instance of contestation over how climate change is manifesting, and tacitly, 
what is causing it, Karen subtly queries this account with ‘you reckon?’ (line 209), and 
subsequently advances her own exemplar of the cyclical nature of the weather, 
evidencing this with ‘those catchments have all filled up again’ (line 217-18). Weighing 
into the debate, Ian (line 219) invokes memories of the ‘Little Blue Lake’ and ‘Valley 
Lakes’, and the lake’s respective water levels over a period of ten years - within a 
timeframe ranging from when he was ‘a baby’ (line 228-29).  
 
What this extract strikingly illustrates is the utility of experiential ‘evidence’ for making 
sense of climate change impacts in forms that render it a concern.  Ian’s telling of how 
the water levels have changed in his lifetime at ‘Little Blue Lake’ presents climate 
change as a phenomenon that is current and tangible, implicitly combating alternative, 
temporally distant, accounts that can consequently generate greater psychological 
distance. 
2.5.3 Summary 
The above extracts speak to the need for climate change risk to be - if it is to become 
meaningful for individuals - associated with situated contexts that render its features 
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intelligible and familiar. Following Spence et al. (2012), we argue that framing the 
impacts of climate change in local contexts can promote action and reduce uncertainly 
about climate change.  
For some of our participants, it is very likely that the localised flooding narratives they 
held were central to transforming a potentially abstract notion of climate change risk 
into a situated threat, this imbued with meaning and some degree of emotional 
valance.  
 
The role of vivid personal experiences in decision-making and judgement processes 
has been widely studied and articulated within psychology (Marx et al., 2007; Nisbett & 
Ross, 1980; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Much of this research emphasises the 
superior role experiential and affective cognitive processes play in how information is 
perceived, and how these processes are sometimes privileged over logical processes, 
employing ‘rational’, probabilistic, and statistical information processes. Founded on 
this assumption, Marx and colleagues have argued that climate change 
communications need to be “designed to create, recall and highlight relevant personal 
experience and elicit affective responses (which) can lead to more public attention to, 
processing of, and engagement with forecasts of climate variability...” (p. 56). 
Moreover, as has been demonstrated elsewhere (Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Reser et 
al., 2012b; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010), there exists close linkages between direct 
experience of climate change impacts, its salience as an issue, and public 
engagement.   
 
Similarly, as we have evidenced, for those participants in receipt of salient personal 
narratives and representational memories associated with climate events, these could 
act as meaningful analogues for the putatively diffuse idea of climate change, whilst 
potentially driving adaptation and mitigative behaviours. Moreover, although difficult to 
represent in the extracts, when participants recounted vivid narratives of local flooding 
and water shortages, it was discernable that they were imbued with a degree of 
emotional valence. This emotional response could, we contend, very well be a function 
of participants’ sense of place and identity (Adger, Barnett, Chapin, & Ellemor, 2011).  
 
According to Adger and colleagues (2011), “a focus on places highlights the local 
material and symbolic contexts in which people create their lives and through which 
those lives derive meaning” (p. 2). The affective and identity meanings attributed to a 
sense of place is argued to constitute a fertile pathway to engender community 
resilience as this provides a scale and dimension to risk appraisal that sidesteps many 
of the political and geopolitical complexities that often draw attention away from the 
perceived salience of climate change. The implication for climate change 
communication strategies, then, could be to identify the valued objects at risk, and 
finesse communications to resonate most effectively for various social cohorts. 
 
However, it is worth noting that direct experience of climate events, or disasters, cannot 
be linearly linked to changes in understanding and responses to climate change. As 
Whitmarsh (2008a) has shown, people who had first-hand experience of flooding were 
no more likely to engage with adaptation strategies to mitigate the hazard in the future, 
and did not differ to those who had not experienced flooding in their understanding that 
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flooding was a consequence of climate change. There are potentially numerous 
mediating influences at play between experience of weather events and climate 
change perception. Spence et al. (2012) have contended that interaction between 
flooding events and the increased salience of climate change in public discourse could 
change people’s overall perception of climate change. Similarly, the qualitative data 
examined here suggests that individuals employ various experiential and second-hand 
resources in their sense-making, and this could provide encouraging opportunities to 
engage communities with climate change. 
 
2.5.4 The problem with adaptation 
‘Adaptation’ is now considered one of core elements of the international strategy on 
climate change (Dovers, 2009; Ribot, 2011). Although adaptation can be defined in 
various ways (Reser & Swim, 2011), in this study, we characterise ‘adaptation’ as 
practices, or adjustments, people have made, or plan to deploy, that function to 
increase their resilience to the risks posed by climate change. Moreover, we take the 
position that adaptation is not singularly reduced to behaviours and attitudes that 
mitigate stressors associated with climate change - but instead, is essentially a 
dynamic process, including social and political factors that disproportionately spread 
degrees of vulnerability across stratified social groups. Indeed, As Ribot argues, the 
term ‘adaptation’ is problematic because of its occlusion of the broader set of 
experiential, cultural and material factors that impact on peoples’ capacities.  
 
The term adaptation often focuses on qualities of the hazard itself (much like classical 
psychometric ‘risk perception’ analysis), whilst ignoring questions pertaining to why 
some segments of society are more vulnerable than others. Alternatively, analysis of 
‘vulnerability’, as opposed to ‘adaptation’, is posited to contextualise analysis to 
incorporate a wider focus on the underlying material realities that contribute to make 
some groups more vulnerable than others. This conceptualisation of adaptation 
capacity, or ‘vulnerability’, undergirded by socio-cultural and political arrangements, 
informs the following analysis. 
 
One of the principle aims of this study is to examine how participants acknowledged, 
construed and oriented to potential adaptation action on climate change. To address 
this, focus group participants were asked the question ‘how could you protect yourself 
from climate change?’ Unsurprisingly, there was significant variation in how this 
question was oriented to, but answers were regularly framed with caveats, often 
detailing parameters to adaptation capacity. The following section illustrates how these 
constraining factors are interconnected with socio-economic and geographical 
conditions participants were living with.  
In the next extract, installing a water tank is constructed by participants in the Mount 
Gambier focus group as circumscribed by their capacity to invest in this adaptation 
device.   
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Extract 14. 
 
 
The ‘initial outlay’ for water-saving technology, and other costly investments, were 
perceived as serious obstacles to managing climate change risk, especially for those 
renting and on a low income. Most obviously, participants acknowledged that the 
instillation of water tanks could constitute a positive adaptive action, but the cost 
associated with this measure proved prohibitory. Moreover, the ‘initial outlay’ (line 953) 
to buy and install a water tank is discerned as not paying for itself in a timeframe that 
was deemed affordable.  
 
Similarly, a number of participants across the four focus groups developed ‘economic’ 
justifications for not installing solar systems and water tanks. In the next extract, 
investing in structural changes to a property is depicted as an efficacious adaptation 
measure, but other adaptation behaviors are deemed more practicable. 
 
Extract 15. 
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In this extract, Gail contends that ‘double brick’ (line 375) is a comparatively better 
insulator than ‘brick veneer’ (line 375), though acknowledges, nonetheless, that her 
house is brick veneer, and ‘tinting’ (line 377) is conveyed as a realistic choice. Suzy, 
responding to the interviewer’s question about the viability of double brick and tinted 
glass, responds that it is ‘the cost factor’ (line 383) that restricts this choice. Other 
participants weigh in, and behaviours such as closing curtains, going to the beach and 
planting ‘deciduous plants/trees’ (line 394) are noted as alternate strategies.  
 
Understandably, elicited behavioural adaptations to climate change stressors such as 
heat waves were regularly framed with respect to responses that have historically been 
deployed against seasonal extreme heat in South Australia. In this way, climate change 
adaptation could be usefully conceptualised as sourced from a pre-existing trove of 
knowledge (e.g. Smith & Joffe, 2009).This is unremarkable in and of itself, but it is 
interesting to consider how these pre-existing knowledges will function, for example, 
when militating against new extremes of heat, and more novel risk domains, such as 
inundation from the sea. In other words, when making sense of the potentially abstract 
notion of how climate change will impact on local communities in the future, resourcing 
these implications within a repertoire of previous experience may have the effect of 
building a sense of security that constrains planning for hard to imagine risks. 
 
Although some participants propounded that managing the threat of extreme heat was 
within their capacity, chiefly informed by previous coping experiences of extreme heat, 
others who viewed flooding as a serious danger argued that it was those in lower 
socio-economic brackets that were most vulnerable. The next two extracts bear this 
theme out. 
 
Extract 16. 
 
 
Extract 17. 
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A feature of both extracts above, from Port Adelaide and Whyalla focus groups, is the 
way that respondents envisaged differential effects from flooding for two distinct socio-
economic groups. For example, those who have ‘pots of dosh’ (extract 16: line 602) 
and the ‘financial capacity’ (extract 17: line 603), are represented as possessing the 
means by which to relocate from flood-prone areas to safer locales. Conversely, those 
who are ‘poor’ - or at least not wealthy - are positioned as immobile, and thus 
vulnerable to the consequences of inundation from the sea. 
 
This construction of a economically stratified community is illustrated further in the next 
extract, as Brett reiterates how climate change is not selective in who it targets, but 
degrees of vulnerability hinge on individuals’ particular material circumstances. 
 
Extract 18. 
 
For Brett, the dilemma for residents of Whyalla is not that climate change will have 
differential effects on individuals - as the whole population is argued to be equally 
impacted - rather, adaptive capacity, predicated on factors such as whether one ‘has 
enough money’ (line 802), a person’s ‘mobility’ (line 806), and ‘health’ (line 807), are 
explained to differentially account for how people will ‘adjust’. Indeed, adaptive choices, 
circumscribed by personal circumstances, are starkly juxtaposed: leaving the affected 
area; or, staying, and ‘adjusting the best they can’ (line 804-05).   
 
Acknowledging that some groups in society are ostensibly more vulnerable than others 
was also elaborated in the following extract from the focus group in Onkaparinga. 
However, it is not only resilience to catastrophic threats, such as long-term inundation, 
that are perceived as being constrained by personal circumstances, but rather, the 
comparatively normative risk of extreme heat. 
 
Extract 19. 
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This extract features a rare instance within the focus groups where participants noted 
that reliance on air-conditioning, as an adaptive strategy for extreme heat, is wholly 
reliant of the continuity of electrical power. Gail and Suzy articulate a concern that 
electricity supply is not necessarily an assured service in heat wave conditions, and for 
those whose health is dependent on running devices such as fridges and air-
conditioners, they present as a particularly vulnerable segment of society. 
 
In the next extract below, these same participants discuss past practices designed to 
contend with extreme heat, and how for Suzy, this method is still employed by her and 
her family. 
 
Extract 20. 
 
 
For Suzy, the option of window tinting, air-conditioners and ceiling fans are not viable 
options, as she does not, as a tenant, bear the legal right to install cooling devices. In 
this context, utilising the coolest room in the house is reasoned as the most feasible 
coping behaviour open to them. Again, what is clearly discernable in this extract is the 
extreme vulnerability that some sectors of the community bear when extreme weather, 
such as heat waves are experienced. The term ‘adaptation’, again, does not seem 
apposite in describing the socio-economic processes impinging on Suzy’s ability to 
cope with extreme heat. Arguably, her limited agency to purchase cooling systems, or 
demand better insulation from her landlord, erodes her adaptation capacity. But this is 
not synonymous with ‘mal-adaption’, and her vulnerability is partly attributable to 
factors that she may have very little control over. 
2.5.5 Summary  
Marino and Ribot (2012) have defined social stratification as a process by which 
segments of society - distinguished, for example, by gender, income, geography, race, 
age - face discrepant access to resources and opportunities. In the context of climate 
change, social stratification has been argued to shape and determine how various 
groups become differentially vulnerable to climate change risks and associated 
interventions. Clearly, as participants in the focus groups appreciated, social 
stratification, especially in relation to dimensions of wealth inequality plays an important 
role in generating vulnerability by constraining the adaptive choices available. Indeed, 
as Mearns and Norton (2011) note, “climate change acts as a multiplier of existing 
vulnerabilities in a warming and transforming world” (p. 2), and for those participants 
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who identified as socio-economically vulnerable,  their exposure to the effects of 
climate change was keenly discerned.   
 
Thus, as we have illustrated here, the scope of adaptive choices people have at their 
disposal, and their consequential degree of resilience, are intertwined with wider social, 
structural and economic circumstances ‘on the ground’. For some members of 
vulnerable communities, then, the impacts of climate change are framed by 
understandings that delimit potential adaptation action predicated on measures of 
wealth.   
 
In light of these insights, crafting approaches that aim to build resilience in communities 
may need to be heedful of how adaptation communications, promoting resilience, 
resonate with material inequalities affecting people’s ability to make choices to mitigate 
the adverse effects of a changing climate. For example, it is not difficult to imagine how 
promoted adaptation choices, necessitating investment beyond what those in lower 
socio-economic positions could be expected to bear, would be perceived as privileging 
those who can afford such protection. Such messages may entrench assumptions that 
function to further balkanise socially stratified cohorts, and the design of adaptation 
strategy will need to consider the implicit nature of communication messages and it 
links to the social material realities of peoples’ lives. 
2.6 Focus group conclusion 
In this section we have illustrated how public understanding of climate change is 
comprised of a complex, interrelated stock of common-sense thinking, variably framed 
by ‘temporal distancing’, previous direct experiences, personal values (i.e. 
intergenerational concerns), and perceived material and institutional realities. Analysis 
has explicated that climate change will most often be viewed through various lay-
frames of reference, which are constituted in psychological, affective, socio-cultural, 
and experiential ways. Especially emblematic of this complexity was employment of a 
‘temporal distancing’ frame to depict climate change as impacting on future 
generations.  
A number of studies have broadly characterised temporal distancing, an element of 
‘psychological distancing’ (Liberman & Trope, 2008), as a potential barrier to ‘risk 
perception’, and by implication, environmental behavioural change (e.g. Leiserowitz et 
al., 2010; Lorenzoni & Pidgeon, 2006; Spence et al., 2011; Whitmarsh, 2008a). 
However, as we have shown, for some participants, this framing did not necessarily 
preclude participants from communicating their concern about the impacts of climate 
change, and this concern, we suggest, could have stemmed from a closely held value 
system pertaining to ethical, intergenerational justice values.   
 
Furthermore, analysis shows that adaptation choices, for some individuals, are 
seriously constrained by their financial and material position. It is broadly accepted that 
climate change will have differential impacts on those social groups who are already 
disenfranchised and vulnerable to non-climate related hazards (e.g. Adger, 2006). Most 
obviously, engagement and communication strategies need to be sensitive and 
recognise such constraints, and arguably, aim to remedy some of the more trenchant 
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inequalities that exacerbate social groups’ ability to access resources and build 
resilience.  
 
We also suggest that adaptation messages be segmented along social-cultural lines, 
where different messages can resonate with different audiences. This segmentation 
can also allow for a more democratic, dialogic engagement with different publics, which 
can be effective in affording deeper and more nuanced communications (Ockwell et al., 
2009; Whitmarsh, 2008b).  
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3. LAY UNDERSTANDINGS OF CLIMATE CHANGE IN SOUTH 
AUSTRALIAN SURVEY 
3.1 Survey methodology 
As previously noted, this research utilises a between-method approach (e.g. Denzin, 
1978; Mathison, 1988), employed to explore the research questions that have evolved 
as the research project progressed. All methodologies have their inherent flaws and 
limitations, and by employing plural methods, each method can, notionally, make up for 
the other’s inherent weaknesses (Teddlie &Tashakkori, 1998). As we have noted, the 
discursive framings of climate change observed in the focus groups were elaborated 
though a close-grained discursive analysis of speaker words. However, although these 
frames are argued to be resourced from the socially constituted stock of knowledge, a 
discursive methodology does preclude direct claims of ‘genralizability’ - as it is typically 
understood - to wider populations. The survey methodology employed in this section 
aims to further investigate some of the discursive frames identified in the focus groups 
with quantitative measures. 
3.1.1 Survey structure and questions 
The survey addressed a number of key psychological and knowledge variables relating 
to climate change risk understandings, concern, affect, self-efficacy, social 
representations, and adaptation knowledge and intentions. The development of the 
survey variables was informed by a literature review, and adapted for the purposes of 
this study and to meet the restrictions of the CATI survey methodology. The principle 
composite variables are categorised as follows: 
 
1. Climate change - causal understandings. 
  
This single item variable addresses the question of the ‘cause of climate change’. A 
preamble was read by the interviewer (see Appendix A), defining what is ‘commonly 
known as climate change’ as attributable to increased levels of carbon dioxide in the 
atmosphere, which ‘scientists’ have warned will have adverse affects on humans and 
the natural environment. Respondents were then asked ‘what is causing climate 
change?’ and were presented with a number of single response-option choices, 
ranging from ‘mainly caused by human activity’; ‘mainly caused by natural fluctuations’, 
‘both natural and human causes’ (ratio then requested); or, ‘it’s not happening’. 
 
2. Climate change risk domain salience variable 
 
This variable is comprised of eight possible risk domain items: heat waves; flooding 
from rain; sea level rise; water shortages and droughts; serious illness; negative 
consequences for agriculture and other industry; food shortages; adverse 
consequences for the natural environment. Although not an exhaustive list of known 
potential climate related impacts, the domains were selected on the basis that they 
represented a range of potential risks for the State of South Australia based on 
predictive modelling (e.g. CSIRO-BoM, 2007). Informed by the psychometric risk 
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perception literature (e.g. Lichtenstein et al., 1978; Slovic, 1987, 2000;), and Protection 
Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1983), the eight risk domains were measured in terms of 
probability perception (‘likelihood’, e.g. how likely is it that food shortages will occur due 
to climate change?) and catastrophic potential (‘severity’, e.g. how severe will food 
shortages be due to climate change?). The decision to frame risk domain perception 
items on two discrete dimensions was conceptually informed by the literature, and 
intended to explore potential divergence across the eight risk domains. It is important to 
note that all questions were broadly framed as risks posed to ‘South Australia over the 
next 50 years’.  
Likelihood and severity scores for the eight risk domains were aggregated to comprise 
a composite score. Reliability analysis was conducted, and a Cronbach alpha 
coefficient of .94 suggests good internal consistency. 
 
3. Temporal distance variable. 
 
This single-item variable is widely employed in the extant literature (e.g. Leviston & 
Walker, 2011) to explore respondents’ perception of the timeframes associated with 
climate change. This question was formulated thus: ‘when do you think the effects of 
climate change will begin to happen?’ (B.17). As previously noted, one of the more 
important findings from the focus groups was participants’ depiction of climate change 
as a temporally distant risk. Although not commensurate with the qualitative analysis, 
this variable further operationalizes this construct with a generalizable sample.  
 
4. Concern, affect and representation 
 
A significant theme running through research on public understandings of climate 
change, and risk perception more generally, is the measurement of ‘concern’, affective 
response (e.g. ‘good’ or ‘bad’) and associated representational content (e.g. 
Leiserowitz, 2005, 2006; Slovic, 2010; Slovic, Flynn & Layman, 1992). Broadly 
speaking, ‘concern’, affect and imagery are posited as important predictors of risk 
perception, engagement on climate change and attempts to foster protective 
responses. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of climate change without associating it 
with various evaluative meanings and affective elements - as it has always been a 
contested social issue, and for some people, embodies a  serious threat to cherished 
ways of life and invaluable natural systems. For this study, then, informed by the 
relevant literature, we include a number of survey items that investigated general 
‘concern’ about climate change (Question B. 18); who or what this concern is for (B. 
19); and affective imagery (C. 1 and C. 2). Reponses to these items were analysed 
descriptively.  
 
5. Self - collective-efficacy and locus of responsibility. 
Protection Motivation Theory (PMT) (Grothmann & Pratt, 2005; Rogers,1983) and The 
Theory of  Planned Behaviour (Ajzen, 1991) have highlighted the role of ‘self-efficacy’ 
(or, ‘perceived behavioural control’) in determining whether individuals will perceive a 
protective behaviour favourably, and go on to enact it. Accordingly, the concept of self-
efficacy has recently become a key concept in applied psychology (Vancouver, More & 
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Yoder, 2008), and work that addresses climate change understandings (e.g. Kellstedt, 
Zahran & Vedlitz, 1998). Bandura (1997) maintains that the concept of self-efficacy is 
the most reliable predictor of what, if any, behaviours we choose to execute - and with 
respects to adaptation responses to climate change, perceived self-efficacy, response 
efficacy and collective efficacy are considered crucial factors in human agency. Thus, 
the present survey measured self-efficacy, collective efficacy (community) and what we 
coin ‘government responsibility’, with four survey items (B.20-B23) constructed 
purposively for this survey, but loosely based on Kellstedt et al.’s ‘Personal efficacy for 
global warming scale’ (2008). 
 
6. Adaptation knowledge and intention 
 
Most obviously, being in receipt of adaptation knowledge, and holding intentions to 
enact this knowledge are crucial factors in determining if, and in what way, individuals 
will engage in adaptation behaviours.  
 
One of the most instrumental theories in social psychology describing the relationship 
between cognition and behaviour is Ajzen and Fishbein’s (1980) ‘Theory of Planned 
Behaviour’ (TPB) (Cooke & Sheeran, 2004). According to the TPB, behaviours are best 
predicted by an individual’s intention to behave in a particular way i.e. ‘I intend to use 
air-conditioning more when it becomes very hot’ is thus highly predictive of that 
behaviour. Most studies investigating perceptions and understandings of climate 
change focus on measuring intentions to engage in mitigation behaviours, such as 
supporting policies aimed at lowering CO2 emissions, and other pro-environmental 
actions (e.g. O’Conner, Bord, Yarnel & Wiefek, 2002). Surprisingly, however, little 
research has addressed adaptation knowledge, and one of the principle aims of this 
research is to what understandings South Australians hold in regard to adaptation 
climate change risk. 
 
Three survey items comprise this variable. Item D 1 addresses whether respondents 
broadly appraised the need to make changes to their daily routine because of climate 
change in the future. Items D.2, D. 3 asked (open response format) respondents how 
they would protect themselves from the following climate change risks: extreme heat, 
and the risk from flooding.  
3.1.2 Administration of the Computer Assisted Telephone Interviewing 
(CATI) survey  
The survey was administered by the Population Research and Outcome Studies 
(PROS) at The University of Adelaide, in conjunction with Harrison Health Research 
employing a CATI (computer aided telephone interviewing) system, whereby 
respondents’ answers were entered directly into the computer by the interviewer. The 
main advantages of this system are the precise ordering and timing of call backs and 
correct sequencing of questions as specific answers are given. The CATI system 
enforces a range of checks on each response with most questions having a set of pre-
determined response categories. The open-ended responses are recorded verbatim by 
the interviewer. 
 
A pilot survey was conducted on 8th June 2012. A number of question framings were 
identified as problematic and subsequently reformulated to aid interpretability. 
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3.1.3 Sample Selection and participation rates  
A rigorous sampling protocol, with up to ten separate ‘call backs’ (if needed) to selected 
households with landlines was utilised.  Respondents, over the age of 18, were 
selected at random within the household to take part in the survey. If the individual 
selected to participate was unable or not willing to be interviewed, the household was 
not replaced with another. 
 
All households in SA with a telephone number listed in the Electronic White Pages 
(EWP) were eligible for selection. Only one interview was conducted per household. 
Where more than one person aged 18 or over resided in the household, the 
respondent was the person who was last to have their birthday. From the 1750 
households selected in South Australia, 500 interviews were conducted with a 
participation rate of 48.0% (number of interviews completed divided by the overall 
number of contacts made).  
 
All interviewing was conducted by professional interviewers from 14/06/2012 -
20/07/2012. Telephone calls were made between 10.00am and 8.30pm weekdays and 
10am to 5pm on weekends.  
 
3.1.4 Demographic profile 
The survey sample comprised of 500 South Australian respondents, ranging from 18 
years to 96 years of age. Tables 1 and 2, and Figure 1, describe the sample profile by 
age, gender, area of residence and political orientation. 
 
South Australia is a highly urbanised state, with 77.10% of the total population residing 
in the greater Adelaide region (ABS, 2011). The sample for this survey is very similar to 
the state profile. This geographical profile is important to this study, as climate change 
‘risk perception’ is putatively affected by locally contingent understandings of threat 
(Brody et al., 2008; Reser et al., 2012). Further, we contend that discrete regional, 
socio-cultural and political contexts also function to affect climate change and 
adaptation understandings. A detailed breakdown of respondents’ geographical 
location is presented in Appendix 1, but overall, the geographical profile is very similar 
to the state profile. 
 
The political orientation of respondents is also highly pertinent to this investigation. A 
number of researchers (e.g. Etkin & Ho, 2007; Hulme, 2009; Slovic, 2000) have 
recognised the role of political and ideological factors on climate change perception 
and understanding, and Figure 1 reveals that the sample was generally  spread 
between Labour, Liberal and ‘swinging voters’.  
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Table 1: Age and gender profile 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2: Place of residence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Figure 1: Political orientation 
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3.2 Survey research findings 
As previously noted, measuring degrees of ‘belief in climate change’ is a complex 
social scientific business - and for some respondents, the question is imbued with, and 
reflective of, closely held worldviews, political orientations and ideological beliefs. 
Question B.1 was designed to yield data that could provide important insights into the 
nature of causal understandings of climate change. We asked respondents, ‘What do 
you think is causing climate change?’ Respondents were then asked to choose from 
the following response options: 1) It is mainly caused by natural fluctuation; 2) It is 
mainly caused by humans burning oil, gas and coal; 3) both natural fluctuations and 
human causes; 4) it is not happening, or; 5) don’t know.  
 
Figure 2 represents a summary of the findings for question B.1. What is striking, in the 
first instance is the comparably low percentage of respondents who out rightly rejected 
the notion that climate change was happening (2.5%, or 12 individuals). Leviston and 
Walker (2011) found that 17.2% responded ‘no’ to a similarly worded question. 
However, when Leviston and Walker reformulated the question ‘what best described 
your thoughts on climate change?’ and provided response options, only 5.6% of 
respondents chose ‘I don’t think climate change is happening’. Clearly, question 
framing effects are exerting influence in these results (e.g. Singer et al., 2010), and 
question interpretation is ostensibly a subjective, interpretive process, whereby the 
meaning attributed by respondents to terms such as ‘mainly caused’, ‘primarily caused’ 
and ‘natural fluctuations’, may not always accord with the researcher’s intended 
meaning.  
 
Nevertheless, while these methodological limitations are not easily resolved, what 
these results suggest is how ‘belief’ in climate change is comprised of variegated - and 
potentially fluid - positions, differentiated by understandings linked to the attribution of 
cause. In particular, our results show that a majority (52.9%) endorsed a mixed natural 
fluctuations/human cause response.  
 
To explore this question further, 236 respondents who chose a ‘mixed-cause’ response 
to question B.1 were subsequently asked for a ‘ratio’ of causal influence, quantifying 
what mixed percentage of climate change was attributable to human activity and 
natural fluctuations. Figure 1.2 summarises these results.  
 
Notably, when asked to consider a causal ratio, a majority of responses fall into the 
30/70 (natural/human), 40/60, or 50/50-60/40 response categories. As other studies in 
Australia have suggested (e.g. Leviston & Walker, 2011; Reser et al., 2012a) the 
causes of climate change are still, for a significant number of Australians, ambiguous 
(or ambivalent?). In particular, when respondents were asked to provide an attribution 
of cause in a ratio formulation, they lean towards figures where ‘natural fluctuations’ 
comprise a significant influence. As noted earlier, variable attributions of cause for 
climate change can (indirectly) influence support for various policy alternatives 
(Bostrom et al., 2012).  
 
What was also observable in the previous focus group analysis was how a ‘natural 
fluctuation theory’ could subsequently inform interpretations of local geographic 
features (extract 33 ‘Little Blue lake’). Hence, it could be reasonable to argue  that 
casual thinking plays an important role in interpretations of the seriousness of 
experienced changes to the local environment, and hence, risk perception and 
subsequent rationalisations for adaptation (in)action.   
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Figure 2: What do you think is causing climate change? 
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3.2.1 Risk domain perception 
Although an extensive psychometric risk perception literature has examined the ‘risk 
characteristics’ of a large range of environmental hazards (see Slovic, 2000, for an 
overview), there is comparably scant research conducted in Australia examining lay 
perceptions of climate change risk (but see Ashworth et al., 2011; Leviston & Walker, 
2011; Reser et al., 2012a) and even less empirical work has attempted to explicate 
how threat appraisals are differentiated by risk domains, such as heat wave, flooding 
and food shortages. Questions B.2-B.16 address the question of risk domain salience 
in relation to eight risk domains likely to be experienced in South Australia. 
 
As previously noted, drawing from the psychometric literature (e.g. Slovic, 2000), the 
risk domain questions were asked in two forms, pertaining to dimensions of ‘probability’ 
(likelihood) and catastrophic potential (severity). For example, respondents were 
initially asked on a 5 -point likert scale (e.g. 1. not at all severe – 5. very severe): ‘In 
your personal opinion, how severe will the following consequences of climate 
change be in South Australia over the next 50 years?’ Following questions 
addressed each risk domain, for example, ‘How severe will the consequences be 
from more frequent and extreme heat waves, related to climate change?’ This 
procedure was repeated for the ‘likelihood’ risk dimension (see Appendix A for question 
schedule). Scores yielded from each dimension (likelihood and severity) were summed, 
and a mean computed by dividing this score by two, to comprise a ‘total risk domain 
score’ out of ten (score can range from 2 to10), with higher scores indicating higher 
perceived risk. ‘Don’t know’ responses were not included in the analysis, and those 
who stated that climate change was not happening were not asked to answer risk 
domain questions. 
 
As Figure 4 summarises, all risk domains measured over the midway of scale (5), 
suggesting that respondents appraised all 8 climate change risks as serious threats to 
South Australia over the next 50 years. What is interesting in this result is the observed 
variability between risk domain salience, and to explore whether significant differences 
between risk domain scores existed, a one-way repeated measures ANOVA was 
conducted. A significant effect for risk domain was found, Wilks’ Lambada = .445 F (7, 
346) = 61.663, p<.0000, multivariate partial eta squared = .555. A post-hoc analysis 
using Bonferroni adjustment identified statistically significant differences between many 
of the risk domains. Most notably, perceived risk from disease (M = 5.9), food 
shortages (M = 6.20) and sea level rise (M = 5.92) scored significantly lower than heat 
waves (M = 7.1), water shortages and drought (M = 7.22), risk to agriculture (M = 7.48), 
and the natural environment (M = 7.33).  
 
What this result suggests is that discrete risks attributable to climate change are, 
unsurprisingly, differentially salient. We suspect that because the South Australian 
public derives many of its most vivid representations of climate change from a stock of 
knowledge garnered from experience and from discourses circulating in the social 
realm, more abstract or distal threats, such as dengue fever and Ross River virus, and 
extensive food shortages resulting from climate change, have less salience attached to 
them.  
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Contrastingly, the most salient risks were anchored to well understood, or experienced, 
or widely reported climactic phenomenon (heat waves and droughts), or linked to 
agriculture and the environment - two historical domains of concern in Australia, not 
uniquely linked to climate change per se. Again this finding could suggest that the risks 
that are most easily brought to mind in reference to climate change are those that have 
been directly experienced.  
 
Water shortages, droughts, and associated threats to the agricultural sector are 
perennial themes in the South Australia context, and as previous research (e.g. 
Lorenzoni et al., 2007; O’Neill & Hulme, 2009) has contended, local frames of 
reference have potential for meaningfully engaging individuals with climate change. It 
could be suggested that if the consequences from climate change are construed 
through a lens of previous experience with, and knowledge of, phenomenon such as 
drought and heatwaves, these may present as the most salient and intelligible frames 
with which to shape communication strategies in the South Australian context. 
 
 
Figure 4: Climate change risk domain salience 
 
3.2.2 Temporal distance 
As discussed in some detail in the focus group section of this report, some participants 
framed climate change as a psychologically distant risk, especially in terms of temporal 
distance. This survey question further addresses this notion by asking respondents 
‘When do you think climate change will begin to happen?’ Results from this 
question (B.17) are represented in Figure 5 below. 
 
Comparable to three recent Australian surveys (e.g. Ashworth et al., 2011; Leviston & 
Walker, 2011; Reser et al., 2012a), a majority of respondents (63.77%) reported that 
climate change was ‘already happening’. Very few endorsed the view that climate 
change would happen ‘in a few years’ (3.21%), but a more significant proportion of 
respondents agreed that it would either begin within ‘20 years’ (11.55%), or ‘50 years’ 
(10.72%). Although a majority of respondents clearly conceived the process of generic 
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and ‘50 year’ categories are aggregated (22.27%) agreed that this process would 
actualise sometime in the future.  
 
In the United States, research has found that many Americans believe they are not 
personally at risk from climate change, but apprehend it will largely affect future 
generations (Leiserowitz et al., 2010). Leiserowitz and colleagues found that 42% of 
Americans believe they will be ‘personally’ harmed, whilst 68% purported that climate 
change will harm future generations. Closer to home, Reser et al. (2012) shows that 
54% of Australian respondents believed that ‘we are already feeling the effects of 
climate change’, whilst 17% responded that they would experience the implications of 
climate change within 10 to 25 years.  
The current study’s findings do suggest that South Australian respondents generally 
believe that climate change is a process that is manifesting now, but for some, the 
phenomenon is still one that will essentially come to fruition in the future. It is also 
plausible that people hold to the belief that climate change is manifest now, but in the 
future, increasingly extreme consequences will be experienced.  
 
In any case, it is promising that this finding, echoing previous survey work (e.g. 
Leiserowitz et al., 2012b; Reser et al., 2012a) suggests that, on the whole, there exists 
a growing recognition that climate change, in some form, is now being experienced. It 
is interesting to consider this in light of the theme identified in the focus groups that 
illustrated how certain local weather events could be perceived as exemplars of climate 
change. Attributing extreme weather events, or repeated extreme weather events (e.g. 
flooding in Queensland), to climate change, appears to be an important factor in 
shaping peoples’ belief about climate change. Borick and Rabe (2010) in a US study 
found that respondents were beginning to account for extreme weather in their local 
area as evidence for climate change, although political affiliations were also found to be 
influencing this position.  
 
Making connections between ‘extreme weather’ events as consequences of climate 
change, as some focus group participants articulated, appears to be a critical 
component of risk perception and potentially, protective behaviour change. In the 
United States, a growing majority of Americans are drawing causal links between 
climate change and “unusual weather events” (Leiserowitz et al., 2012b). The 
development of such linkages should be treated cautiously, however, as rapid 
improvements in the ‘weather’, or increased rainfalls, can just as easily provide 
‘evidence’ for refuting climate change as a real and ongoing threat.  
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Figure 5: When do you think climate change will begin to happen? 
 
3.2.3 Concern, representation and affect 
3.2.3.1 Concern 
For researchers attempting to better understand how climate change is made sense of, 
psychological constructs such as ‘concern’, emotional states (affect) and 
representational imagery have become important empirical focuses of study (e.g. 
O’Neill & Hulme, 2009; O’Neill & Nicholson-Cole, 2009; Smith & Joffe, 2012). The 
following survey items (B.19, B.20, C.1 and C.2) examined the degree to which 
respondents reported to be concerned about climate change, who or what they were 
primarily concerned for, and the imagery or category terms they connotatively 
associated with climate change. 
 
Figure 6 below summarises results from the question, ‘How concerned are you about 
climate change?’ What is notable here is although 65.4% of respondents stated they 
were ‘concerned’ or ‘very concerned’ about climate change, 32% reported that they 
were ‘not at all’, ‘or not very concerned’, or ‘neutral’. This finding is interesting when 
considered in light of the risk domain perception findings reported earlier, suggesting 
that a large proportion of the respondents viewed climate change to pose serious 
threats to human, institutional and environmental domains. When asked to rate their 
‘concern’, some of these same respondents clearly did not construe these risks as 
particularly ‘concerning’. Of course, whether one appraises a risk as ‘concerning’ is 
influenced by a number of variables, such as perceptions of personal and social 
vulnerability, ones’ ethical and environmental values, and so on. Although not directly 
comparable to previous research that has attempted to measure degrees of climate 
change concern, this finding is remarkably similar to Reser et al’s (2012a) finding that 
64% of their Australian sample reported being ‘very’ or ‘fairly’ concerned  about climate 
change. Interestingly, in contrast to a study conducted in the United States, which 
found that over half of Americans (58%) are either ‘somewhat’ or ‘very worried’ about 
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climate change (Leiserowitz et al., 2012a), the proportion of public ‘concern’ in South 
Australia appears to be only marginally greater.  
 
 
Figure 6: How concerned are you about climate change? 
 
Figure 7: Thinking about the risk associated with climate change, who do you 
worry about the most? (Single response. Responses options provided and 
volunteered)  
3.2.3.2 Concern for who, or what 
Question B.20 further explores the construct of ‘concern’ regarding climate change, 
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about this result is the two dominant response categories: ‘myself and my family’, and 
‘future generations’. The latter response is especially interesting as it was volunteered, 
suggesting it was a highly salient comparative concern. Furthermore, when taking into 
consideration that for those who chose the category ‘myself and my family’, this 
response could also potentially subsume concern for younger generations.  
 
This finding again speaks to the theme of psychological distance (Spence et al., 2012), 
and attests to the salience of ‘a risk to future generations’ discourse threading through 
the South Australian community. The distancing of climate change as a threat 
presetting to spatially distant places, peoples and future generations has been evident 
in numerous studies (e.g. Leiserowitz et al., 2012a; Spence & Pidgeon, 2010). 
However, as the focus group data has demonstrated, framing climate change as 
temporally distant does not automatically preclude it from being perceived as a serious 
threat, deserving a response. The implication of this for adaptation (and mitigation) 
communication strategies could be that a ‘future generations’ oriented communications 
could usefully foster - at least for those holding a propensity for such concerns - action 
and policy acceptance. It is unclear whether such an ‘intergenerational ethics’ framing 
of climate change could engender more immediate adaptive responses, but is arguable 
that individuals’ hold more than one ‘concern’ about how a changing climate might 
have consequences on their lives, and communication interventions may need to 
consider these more closely when developing more nuanced and segmented 
strategies.  
3.2.3.3 Representation and affect 
As explored in the focus group analysis, some participants when talking about climate 
change impacts draw upon experientially based images, which arguably functioned to 
concretise such threats, removing them from the abstract and notionally rendering 
them meaningful. It is now generally understood that the psychological processes 
involved in appraising climate change risk may not be best characterised as singularly 
involving processes of rational, analytical and probabilistic thinking - carefully weighing 
up the odds and degree of potential damage - to base responses on. Instead, ‘risk 
perception’ implicates visual imagery and associated affective states (O’Neill & Hulme, 
2009; Smith & Joffe, 2009, 2012). The power of visual imagery to concretise risk 
messages and evoke protective practices is understood to have import for devising 
new communication strategies, improving upon ‘information deficit’, rational-actor 
models that have been shown to have limited impact on attitude and behaviour change 
(Hulme, 2009; Irwin & Wynne, 1996; Kellstedt et al., 2008).  
 
Moreover, as Daniel Kahneman (2011) has advanced, humans are likely to depend on 
‘quick and dirty’ systems of information processing to evaluate complex issues such as 
climate change, instead of slow and deeply analytical systems very few lay individuals 
have the motivation and time to invest in. Thus, the content of affectively imbued visual 
imagery, or ‘social representations’ (Moscovici, 1984), can usefully beget evaluative 
and moral associations necessary for individuals to make sense of a somewhat 
abstract and difficult to imagine process.    
 
To analyse affective representations, the survey utilised a word association instrument 
to measure the connotative meanings associated with climate change. Word 
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associations have been widely employed in psychology to generate user-derived 
lexicons of descriptors, categories, images, metaphors, and linked affective valences 
(e.g. Deese, 1965; Osgood, May & Miron, 1975; Slazey & Deese, 1978). For the 
current study, due to time limitations curtailing the telephone interview, only one image 
or word was elicited from each respondent. Specifically, respondents were asked in an 
open response format: ‘what is the first image that comes to mind when you think 
about the risks associated with climate change?’ (C. 1). If a response was 
provided, the subsequent question was asked, ‘how would you rate this word or 
image in this context?’ (C. 2). Figure 8 summarises these results.  
 
 
 
Figure 8: What words or images come to mind when you think of climate 
change? Top 16 categories shown, comprising 84% of the total.  
First, it is noteworthy that 22.70% of respondents could not invoke an image or 
category term to connotatively represent climate change. Interpreting this result is 
inherently problematic, as potential methodological limitations, such as response 
fatigue and task communication confounds are not easily teased apart from alternate 
interpretations, such as a paucity of representational contents available for 
respondents to draw upon i.e. ‘nothing comes to mind’. However, this result could 
suggest that for some individuals, the notion of climate change was not easily 
characterised by one image or word - but rather, is constituted by a complex array of 
representational and, potentially contradictory elements. It is also possible that instead 
of attempting to truncate their connotative understandings of climate change, 
respondents simply opted to not respond, as they found the question frame too 
restricting. 
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For those who did conjure up a response, the top five categories, ‘drought/water 
shortages’ (9.17%); ‘extreme heat’ (6.59%); ‘flood/sea-level rise’ (6.45%); ‘scepticism 
and lack of scientific clarity’ (4.40%); and ‘catastrophic/extinction’ (5.25%), comprised 
33% of the total. These findings accord with the risk domain findings already reported, 
and further attest to the salience and contextual relevance of these risk domain 
perceptions for the South Australian populous.  
 
More specifically, some words and image responses were not descriptive terms (e.g. 
drought, severe weather); but were, in essence, affective terms, similar to notions of 
‘dread’, fear and suffering. For example, subsumed under the category 
‘catastrophic/extinction’, responses included ‘death’, ‘devastation’ and ‘world ending’. 
Similarly, for the category ‘scorched and dry’, responses were comprised of emotive 
adjectives such as ‘barren’, and phrases such as ‘parched dry ground’ or ‘dead 
animals’.  
 
Of particular note was the category ‘politics’, which included the proper names, ‘Julia 
Gillard’ and ‘Tony Abbot’. As some commentators have lamented, important meanings 
and debates that could contribute to leveraging processes of climate change mitigation 
and adaptation have been overshadowed by the protracted ‘controversy’ over the 
‘carbon tax’. As Joffe (2003) reminds us, the means by which lay people make sense of 
risk imputes affective and inter-subjective processes, located within the socio-cultural 
and ideological sphere. This brief word association supports the contention that for 
some South Australians, risk is inextricably tied to affective imagery associated with 
serious environmental degradation, threats to human survival, droughts, water 
shortages, and flooding, as pervasively reflected in the media and science discourses 
(e.g. BoM, 2012; CSIRO, 2011). Indeed, this finding also suggests that the most salient 
images associated to climate change are putatively resourced from direct and vicarious 
experience of the consequences of extreme weather, that are, throughout history, 
perennially manifest in South Australia. This has implications for the assimilation of risk 
representations, based on images of drought and flooding, that could reduce the 
‘psychological distance’ (Spence at al., 2012) of climate change, thus fostering 
engaging various publics on climate change adaptation.    
 
To address what affective valances were associated with elicited category terms, 
respondents were asked, ‘How would you rate this word or image in this context?’ 
on a 5-point likert item: very negative – 1 to very positive – 5. Figure 9, below, provides 
a summary of mean affect for each category. All elicited words and phrases were rated 
on the negative side of the neutral point (3). Interestingly, however, the category ‘ill 
health’ (M=2.94) was very close to being rated as affectively neutral, and comparatively 
far less negative than all the other response categories. Moreover, the terms that 
comprised this category were relatively benign nouns such as ‘sunburn’, and 
ambiguous category terms such as ‘health’.  
 
What these convergent results seem to suggest is that in the South Australian context, 
understandings of potential health implications arising from climate change are less 
salient than impacts, such as heat waves and water shortages, that have arguably 
been directly or vicariously experienced – concepts that many South Australians were 
familiar with before the construct of climate change became widely acknowledged. 
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Figure 9: How would you rate this word or image in this context? Mean affect 
was rated on a 5 point scale ranging from 1 - Very negative to 5 Very positive. 
Top 15 categories are shown . 
3.2.4 Self/collective efficacy and locus of responsibility 
In relation to the potentially profound scale of climate change - it’s projected 
repercussions, and the extent to which mitigation and adaptation responses will need 
to address deep social, political and economic factors – the examination of how 
individuals make sense of their own ability to cope is fundamental to better 
understanding how, or if, people will engage in adaptation actions.  
 
Holding a belief that some protective action or another will be effective in reducing the 
degree of harm from a potential hazard is an important factor in facilitating adaptation 
intentions and behaviour (Grothmann & Pratt, 2005; Rogers, 1983). Moreover, 
according to Rogers, whether or not an individual will take protective steps will hinge on 
how they perceive their own ability to enact the envisaged coping strategy - that is, 
their ‘self-efficacy’. Conceptually, the notion of self-efficacy is intertwined with beliefs 
related to government responsibility; that is to say, questions pertaining to human 
agency, i.e. ‘can, or do I need to take protective action’, are closely tied to perceptions 
of the role and scope of political entities in protecting the community. Adapting to 
climate change concerns individuals, institutional and multilevel governmental groups. 
We suspect that people hold rather complex construals about who is responsible for 
the risks posed by climate change.  
 
Four questions addresses climate change adaption ‘self-efficacy’, ‘collective efficacy’ 
(community working together) and ‘government responsibility’. These results are 
presented in figure 10.  
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Figure 10: Self, collective and governmental adaptation efficacy (mean score) (1- 
Strongly disagree, 5 - Strongly agree) 
 
These results suggest that a majority of respondents positively viewed their ability to 
reduce the risks associated with climate change. Those who ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly 
agreed’ with the statement (B.20) ‘the risks that climate change poses to me can be 
reduced by my own actions’ comprised 65.7% of the total. A similar result was 
yielded from the ‘community efficacy’ question (B.21) that asked, ‘if my community 
bands together, we can manage the threat of climate change’ (61.5%). In contrast, 
when asked (B.22), ‘it is the government that has ultimate responsibility for 
protecting me from climate change’, 55.2% indicated moderate or strong agreement.  
Further, when respondents were asked (B.23), ‘I want to do something that protects 
me from climate change, but I just don’t think anything will work’, 33.6% ‘agreed’ 
or ‘strongly agreed’.  
 
Response patterns yielded from the efficacy and responsibility questions intimate that 
for some respondents, coping with adverse impacts of climate change, especially 
flooding and water shortages, are conceived as beyond what they could manage 
without assistance from government. Citizens’ perceptions of their own agency to 
mitigate the risks posed by the consequences of a changed climate must be seen from 
a vantage point that recognises the degrees of human agency implicated in climate 
change adaptation and mitigation. Most obviously, there are limits to what individuals 
can be expected to do in preparing for and coping with the impacts of climate change, 
and for some respondents, this was intuitively recognised.    
3.2.5 Adaptation knowledge 
Finally, the survey study attempted to determine the degree to which respondents both 
anticipated the need to take adaptation measures to climate change in the future, and 
what adaptation knowledge they held about coping with water shortages, heat waves 
and flooding. To be clear, these survey questions were not designed to measure 
‘behavioural intention’ or degree of ‘psychological adaptation’ (Reser & Swim, 2012), 
but rather, the breadth of adaptation knowledge respondents held relative to specific 
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risk domains. The adaptation knowledge questions were formulated to specifically 
delineate what adaptive resources respondents thought they could enlist to combat 
three likely impacts of climate change for many South Australians (CSIRO-BoM, 2007).   
 
Figure 11 represents the results yielded from the question (D. 1), ‘It will be necessary 
for me to make changes to my daily routine to deal with climate change risks, 
such as water shortages and heat waves in the future’. A significant percentage 
(76.38%) of respondents either responded ‘agree’ (61.63%) or ‘strongly agree’ 
(14.75%), supporting the recurrent theme identified across survey variables that, on the 
whole, climate change is discerned as an impending threat, necessitating a coping 
response. 
 
 
 
Figure 11: It will be necessary for me to make changes to my daily routine to deal 
with climate change risks, such as water shortages and heat waves in the future  
 
Figure 12: When thinking about the risk of more frequent and extreme heat 
waves in the future, how would you protect yourself from this risk?  
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Respondents were subsequently asked two open-ended questions (D.2, D.3) 
addressing how they would protect themselves from heat waves and flooding. These 
question items were introduced by the contextualising statement, ‘Thinking about the 
risks associated with climate change, now and into the future, I would like to ask 
you some question about how you would cope with these risks’. Reponses were 
coded and collapsed into categories, and Figures 12 and 13 summate these findings. 
When respondents were asked, ‘when thinking about the risk of more frequent and 
extreme heat waves in the future, how would you protect yourself from this 
risk?’, 26.15% invoked behavioural strategies such as staying out of the sun, drinking 
water and drawing window shades. What is striking, however, is the proportion of 
respondents that answered ‘don’t know’ (24.59%), or ‘adaptation is not possible’ 
(5.63%).  
 
Whether this result can be solely attributed to knowledge deficits related to extreme 
heat adaptation - and not, for example, methodological confounds such as ‘response 
fatigue’ - it is difficult to be conclusive. In any case, what this finding suggests is that for 
some South Australians, bringing to mind coping strategies relative to extreme heat is 
not a straight forward, automatic process, and may indicate that extreme heat is not 
broadly conceived as a risk domain that obliges a specific response strategy, even 
when placed in context with climate change. 
 
  
Figure 13: When thinking about the risk form flooding, either from rain or sea 
level rise, how would you protect yourself and your property from risk? 
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Question D.3 asked respondents, ‘when thinking about the risk from flooding, 
either from rain or sea level rise, how would you protect yourself and your 
property from this risk?’ A significant proportion of respondents (42.9%) agreed that 
their property was not subject to flooding. Since flooding exposure from sea-level rise 
and storm events are contingent on proximity to the sea, creeks, rivers, flood plains 
and storm-water catchments/drains - and the survey did not collect respondent’s 
addresses, which could have determined proximal exposure, it is difficult to ascertain 
whether respondents’ perceptions concur with objective flood-risk assessments. 
However, a proportion of respondents do live within local government areas (LGAs) 
such as Port Adelaide-Enfield, Charles Sturt and Onkaparinga, and these have been 
assessed as highly likely to be exposed to serious inundation from sea-level rise, or 
flash flooding from climate change (DCCEE, 2011). In particular, risk assessments 
suggest that by 2100, 23% of residential properties in the city of Port Adelaide-Enfield 
could be affected by sea level rise. In light of this, it is noteworthy that 34.13% (15) of 
the Port Adelaide-Enfield LGA respondents answered that they ‘didn’t live in a flood-
prone area’. This finding is indicative that some South Australians are not cognisant of 
their vulnerability to the dangers of sea-level rise and flooding from rain. 
 
Moreover, when considering the percentage of respondents who answered ‘don’t know’ 
(17.24%), and ‘permanently move to higher ground’, (10.33%), very few provided 
pragmatic strategies, such as ‘using sandbags around the house’ (3.80%). Indeed, a 
majority of responses could be discerned as holding essentially ‘fatalistic’ adaptation 
plans, exemplified by strategies of escape, ‘using insurance’, and permanent relocation 
to less flood prone areas, or, the acquiescent position, ‘adaption is not possible’.  
 
In sum, these findings could suggest that flooding, either from sea level rise, or 
inundation from local watercourses, is not a risk domain that, for many respondents, 
induces tangible protective strategies that could be enacted without great disruption 
and cost. Although adaptation knowledge is unquestionably a necessary condition for 
adaptation behaviour, it is not necessarily sufficient. As the convergent literature on 
adaptation and risk perception has repeatedly demonstrated, there are numerous 
psychological, affective, material and social factors that are brought to bear in 
determining what action an individual will ultimately take in order to shield themselves 
from danger. However, being in receipt of practical adaptation information, informing 
effective protective practices is an essential element in the exercise of protective 
action. The relative lack of pragmatic adaptation strategies found in the current study 
highlights a potential cleft in adaptation knowledge that could be drawn upon in 
instances of more extreme climate change impacts.  
3.3 Survey conclusion 
In accord with previous survey work conducted in Australia (e.g. Ashworth et al., 2011; 
Leviston & Walker, 2011; Reser et al., 2012a), the present analysis suggests that for a 
majority of South Australians, climate change was generally conceived as  a serious 
and current phenomenon that will necessitate adaptation action now and in the future. 
What is less clear, however, is how to interpret results pertaining to respondents’ 
causal attributions for a changing climate. When those respondents who attributed both 
natural and human causes to driving climate change were probed further on what 
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causal ratio (‘natural fluctuations’/‘human cause’) they would ascribe, a majority 
perceived ‘natural fluctuation’s’ to play an important causal role. This is novel finding, 
and deserved further exploration, and may benefit from further qualitative investigation 
into how individuals formulate their accounts, and how such accounts justify adaptation 
and mitigation (in)action (but see Bostrom et al., 2012).  
 
Furthermore, it could be analytically fruitful to delve deeper into how people’s ‘mixed-
cause’ explanations are informed by common sense understandings of, or experience 
with, the nuances of the notion of ‘climate forcing’ (e.g. IPCC, 2007; Liepert, 2010). 
Very generally, the theory of climate-forcing describes how various forcing-agents (e.g. 
Release of CO2 from human activities and volcanoes) initiate perturbations in a climate 
state, leading to imbalances and internal ‘feedbacks’, which ultimately affects the 
overall ‘climate sensitivity’. Notionally, the direct ‘cause’ of such perturbations becomes 
obfuscated, as ‘feedbacks’ further unbalance the complex climate system, obscuring 
the boundary between ‘natural’ and human causes in driving climate change. Hence, 
discriminating between ‘cause’ for climate change and associated weather events or 
biophysical perturbations may very well not be as causally transparent as other risk 
phenomena, and this may comprise a barrier to perceiving climate change as a 
consequence of human activities. As previously noted, previous research has 
demonstrated that different causal beliefs are associated with support of different 
mitigative actions (Bostrom et al., 2012) e.g. carbon tax, or ‘techno-fix’ solutions). More 
intuitively, it is not unreasonable to suggest that if a person endorses a view that 
climate change is in some part caused by ‘natural’ fluctuations to earths biosphere, a 
corollary of this logic may follow that efforts to either adapt or mitigate against human 
causes would be perceived as less that effective. Notably, although most respondents 
construed climate change risk domains as salient, posing a serious threat to South 
Australia, a proportion of respondents had difficulty conjuring up adaptation strategies 
to protect themselves from extreme heat and flooding. It is possible that for some 
South Australians, their familiarity with extreme heat has ‘desensitised’ them to the 
harm it potentially holds. Thus, consciously bringing to mind adaptation practices may 
not be a well-practiced process, and this could partly account for this finding.  
 
Further, this finding may suggest that due to this desensitisation, segments of the 
community may - because they have ‘seen it all before’ – therefore, not hold the 
requisite knowledge or motivation to safely adapt.  
 
More positively, the survey findings revealed, whilst broadly resonating with previous 
Australian survey work (e.g. Ashworth et al., 2011), that climate change is generally  
perceived by people in Australia as posing  a threat that will necessitate adaptation 
responses now and into the future. It could be postulated that because of this general 
acceptance of the phenomenon as ‘real’, communication strategies can now orient and 
finesse their messages, detailing and framing adaptation practices in forms that 
resonate with various social groups. What these findings suggest is that polemics 
surrounding the veracity of climate change science should not be the sole focus for 
policy makers and communicators, as these  are not always directly relevant to the 
public (although they still hold the media enthralled) in their everyday contexts. What 
may be worth turning attention to is effectively shaping adaptation messages as salient 
considerations in individuals’ lives. Furthermore, when considering the focus group 
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findings, adaptation messages will also need to recognise the material realities that 
socially stratified groups face, attending to the notion that vulnerability is not simply a 
matter of individual agency, but also affected by employment status and health status.   
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4. GENERAL CONCLUSION 
The findings delineated in this report have highlighted the following frames of 
reference, which could be exercised in the construction of climate change adaptation 
engagement messages. First, the focus group analysis suggested that the risks posed 
by climate change were variably ‘distanced’, either temporally (future generations), or 
as lacking in urgency when compared to some of the more ‘everyday’ concerns 
impressing on people’s lives. The ‘psychological distance’ of climate change has been 
widely observed (e.g. Spence et al., 2012). Paradoxically, perhaps, the survey findings 
intimated that a large proportion of respondents concurred with the statement that 
climate change was already underway. It could be possible that when some people 
attempt to construe climate change, they reconcile knowledge that climate change is 
both a long-term process, with its impacts changing and growing into the future, and a 
current phenomenon, manifest in subtle ways, especially in terms of the causal 
complexity inherent in ‘climate forcing’ already discussed.  
 
These positions are not mutually exclusive. Rationalising climate change as a 
progressive and propagating phenomenon can, arguably, sit quite comfortably next to a 
belief that its ramifications will be most prominent in the long-term future. As noted in 
the focus group analysis, the temporal distance of climate change can be de-
emphasised by focusing on its progressive nature. This finding could have implications 
for the design of adaptation communications that aim to attenuate the psychological 
distance sometimes attached to climate change.  
 
Second, direct and vicarious experience of climate change impacts on participants’ 
local environments was argued to hold potential for engaging various publics with 
climate change. In particular, we contend that localising climate change in situated 
ways, constructing linkages with locally relevant geographical and built landmarks 
could overcome some of the cognitive and affective barriers inherent in construing 
climate change in distant, abstract formulations.  
 
Third, the survey findings highlight an appreciable lack of pragmatic adaptation 
knowledge in the South Australian community related to flooding and heat waves. 
Reliance on historically successful adaptation strategies will notionally be effective in 
coping with climate change impacts in the short term, but overreliance on such intuitive 
strategies may prove to be less than effective if new degrees of hazards are 
experienced. In light of this, the findings related to ‘self-efficacy’ and ‘community 
efficacy’ beliefs, although fundamental to engaging communities in adaptation 
practices, could also attest to overconfidence in mitigation strategies that have 
previously been effective. This may have important implications for policy designed to 
build community resilience now, but potentially will become more crucial in the future 
where the nature of a changed climate will present new extremes and magnify 
exposure.  
 
Fourth, as this report has demonstrated, and others have cogently argued (e.g. Smith 
& Joffe, 2009, 2012), connotative imagery and affective valence constitutes an 
important component of how people come to make sense of climate change, and 
arguably, rationalise their adaptive responses. In particular, this report has shown that 
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generic climate change ‘concern’ is proportionally high, and a significant percentage of 
South Australians responded they are worried about the effect climate change will have 
for ‘future generations’. The invocation of connotative imagery associated with heat 
waves, droughts and water shortages, were arguably drawn from experiential and 
vicarious knowledge of local weather phenomena.  
 
Indeed, this suggests that climate change is regularly integrated with a stock of 
symbolic and narrative sense-making resources that are locally pertinent. 
4.1 Limitations and opportunities 
 It is worth considering the limitations that were of consequence for the research 
presented here, and how future research may develop knowledge of how climate 
change is understood and responded to by various publics  
 
First, discursive analysis of participants talk is an inherently labour intensive process. 
The iterative nature of analysis, involving repeated close-reading and re-reading is 
fundamentally time-consuming. Further to this, what was most apparent - and not 
wholly unexpected - was the difficulty in recruiting participants to the focus groups. The 
Whyalla and Mount Gambier groups were particularly difficult, and much research time 
was invested in planning for and ensuring the focus groups had participants. These 
difficulties are not ‘limitations’ unique to focus group methodology per se, but in the 
context of the project’s timeframe, ultimately restricted the number of groups that could 
be facilitated, and consequently, affected the scope, and generalizability of the findings.  
 
Once again, while we are not claiming that the discursive framings identified in the 
focus group analysis can be directly extrapolated to the South Australian population. 
Instead, we contend that when situated within the wider literature, and with further 
research, there remains a strong case for arguing that these findings are relevant to 
adaptation communication and policy development in South Australia. Climate change 
is not a well-defined problem in the social sphere, nor can its impacts, mitigation, and 
adaptation solutions be characterised as ‘settled’. The ‘idea’ of climate change is 
malleable, mutative, and has different implications for different groups of people, 
essentially because it holds the potential to destabilise closely held normative ideas, 
values, social and individuals goals (Hulme, 2009). Research that inquires into how the 
idea of climate change is constituted by divergent groups, that delineates how the 
narratives of climate change are intrinsically intermeshed with ideological, political and 
cultural projects, can provide important insights into how individuals and groups 
rationalise their beliefs and behaviours, and notionally, provide important guidance on 
how to engage people on their own terms, in their own lexicons of understanding. In 
essence, as this research has demonstrated, these manifold understandings related to 
the idea of climate change may not be best characterised as ‘misinformed’, or the 
outcome of some biased cognitive process, but instead, reflective of social group 
values, normative understandings and personal interests and priorities. Hulme (2009) 
puts this notion thus: 
 
“If we are to understand climate change and if we are to use climate change 
constructively in our politics, we must first hear and understand these 
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discordant voices, these multifarious human beliefs, values, aspirations and 
behaviours. And especially, we must understand what climate change signifies 
for these important dimensions of human living and human character” (p. xxvi)   
 
This research, then, comprises a modest attempt - within the study’s timeframe and 
funding parameters - to elucidate various ‘discordant voices’ on how climate change 
risk and adaptation practices are understood. Both studies show how ‘risk perception’ 
does not exist within a contextual vacuum, cleaved from peoples’ wider concerns, 
priorities and material realities. Instead, the meanings associated with climate change - 
the various cultural associations, metaphors, affective images and narratives that 
putatively rationalise what action should be taken to tackle its dangers, were interlaced, 
and constituted a dynamic picture of how groups within the South Australian 
community made sense of climate change risk and adaptation. 
4.2 Policy implications 
This report presents an account of climate change understandings in South Australia 
that suggests a significant opportunity for public engagement on climate change and 
adaptation. However, this opportunity, we contend, will only be grasped if policy and 
strategic mechanisms consider the matrix of narrative frames, values, pre-existing 
knowledge, and direct and vicarious experiences that local groups employ to make 
sense of climate change. Communication strategies that gloss over these influences, 
that homogenise and simplify their communications to basic ‘fact’ provision, or rely 
principally on ‘top-down’ legislation are likely to experience less than satisfactory 
outcomes in building community reliance (Ockwell et al., 2009).  
 
What this report argues for is the design and implementation of segmented climate 
change messages, comprised of salient narratives and visual representations that 
speak to those with aligned worldviews, experiences and interests. The power of 
language, narrative, and affective imagery to engender change is often overlooked 
when policy makers narrowly focus on technocratic solutions to the problem of climate 
change. Conversely, the research presented here reveals that public conceptions of 
climate change risk are not anchored to scientific maxims per se, but are tangibly 
linked to and refracted through individuals’ values, collective discourses, media 
representations, and financial and pragmatic conditions being experienced now.  
 
More specifically, this report recommends that communication interventions aiming to 
promote public climate change ‘risk perception’, improve adaptation knowledge, or 
propagate behavioural change, consider the ever fluid nature of how different publics 
frame the issue. The complex interplay between climate science, the media, and the 
public, guarantees that climate change will be interpreted in multiple and dynamic 
ways, and the overriding aim for the current research was to delineate some of the 
framings. In particular, the findings from this research advance that communications, 
either appealing to, or undermining climate change framings, such as risks to younger 
generations; lack of salience in an everyday context; temporal distance framings; and 
problems of adaptation - could be deployed to engage and reorient discourses that 
compel or constrain action on climate change. These framings will not remain static 
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however. The dynamic and mutative nature of social representations and common 
sense guarantees their fluidity (e.g. Howarth, 2006). 
 
There is much work to be done in research and policy arenas to improve knowledge of 
the manifold ways different constituent groups conceive climate change risk and 
adaptation. The current research has provided some pertinent insights into how 
communication and engagement strategies could acknowledge and integrate different 
community perspectives into their approaches. Because climate change often provokes 
introspection into personal, ethical and economic concerns s, its perception and 
response goes way beyond ’scientific’ questions of how and why our climate is 
changing. Talking to communities about climate change, and their role in its mitigation 
and adaptation, will ultimately boil down to how a changing climate will impact on their 
day-to-day lives, interests and values. Climate change will always mean different things 
to different people and the opportunities this threat engenders for social dialogue and 
transformation on questions such as what is valuable, who is most vulnerable, and 
what type of future we want for future generations, are considerable. These social 
dialogues, we propose, are conversations that will shape how climate change is 
‘perceived’ by people, and hence, how we proceed to adapt to and mitigate its threats.  
The role of research, then, is to chart and better understand these dialogues, so as to 
meaningfully engage with and enable these processes. We hope this research has, in 
some small way, advanced this endeavour.  
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APPENDIX A 
Perception of Climate Change Risks and adaptation survey 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Good .......  My name is ........  I’m 
calling from Harrison’s Health 
Research on behalf of the University 
of Adelaide.  We are conducting a 
survey on your perceptions about 
climate change and travelling 
behaviours.  We recently sent you a 
letter about the survey on behalf of 
the University.    
Did you receive the letter? 
(Single response) 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Don’t know 
 
Interviewer note:  If respondent did 
not receive letter, offer to read the 
following: 
  “The survey will be conducted by 
Harrison’s Health Research on 
behalf the University of Adelaide.  
This particular survey will ask you 
about how you think and feel about 
climate change. We understand that 
within the community there exists a 
range of opinions about climate 
change.  Importantly, we are 
interested in hearing about YOUR 
opinions on climate change.  There 
is no right or wrong answers to the 
questions.  So, please, provide 
answers that reflect you personal 
opinion  
 
Could I please speak with the person 
in the household, aged 18 or over, 
who was the last to have a birthday?  
Your phone number has been 
selected randomly from residential 
telephone numbers in the Electronic 
White Pages. 
I can assure you that all information 
given will remain confidential.  The 
answers from all people interviewed 
will be gathered together and 
presented in a report.  No individual 
answers will be passed on. 
The questionnaire will take 
approximately 20 minutes to 
complete, but may take longer 
depending on the number of 
questions that are relevant to you. 
 
Whilst your input to the survey is 
very important to us, participation is 
voluntary and you can choose not to 
answer any particular question or 
any section and you are free to 
withdraw from the survey at any 
time.  Are you willing to participate 
in this survey? 
 
Please be aware that this phone call 
may be listened to by my Supervisor 
for quality control and training 
purposes. 
 
(Single response) 
1. Respondent 
2. Foreign language interviewer 
required  - enter language 
3. Refusal - enter reasons 
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A. Demographics 
 
As some of the next questions relate 
to certain groups of people only, 
could you please tell me… 
 
A.1 How old you are?  
(Single Response) Enter age 
1. Not stated 
2. Don’t know 
Sequence Guide: If A.1 <998 Go to A.3 
 
A.2 Which age group are you in?  
Would it be... 
(Read options. Single response) 
1. 18 to 24 years 
2. 25 to 34 years 
3. 35 to 44 years 
4. 45 to 54 years 
5. 55 to 64 years 
6. 65 to 74 years 
7. 75 years or over 
8. Refused (End interview) 
 
A.3 Sex (ask if unsure) 
1. Male 
2. Female 
 
A.4 Including yourself how many 
people aged 18 or over live in 
this household? 
(Single Response.  Enter number 
of people 18 years or over) 
1. Enter number 
2. Not stated 
A.5 What is the Postcode of the 
house?  
(Single Response.  If postcode is 
not known enter 5999) 
1. Enter number  
2. Not stated 
 
(Sequence Guide: If A.5  5999 Go to 
NS) 
 
A.6 What town or suburb do you 
live in? 
(Single Response.  Enter 
town/suburb) 
1. Enter town/suburb 
B. Risk Dimensions  
 
Some scientists have warned that 
due to increased levels of Carbon 
Dioxide in the earth’s atmosphere, 
there will be an increased risk to 
humans and the natural environment 
from extreme weather.  This is what 
is commonly known as ‘Climate 
Change’.   
 
B.1 What do you think is causing 
climate change?  
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. It is mainly caused by 
natural fluctuations in the 
earth’s climate 
2. It is mainly caused by 
humans burning oil, gas and 
coal 
3. Both natural fluctuations 
and human causes (Specify 
ratio?)…………………. 
4. It is not happening 
5. Don’t know 
6. Refused 
 
Sequence guide:  If B.1 = 4 go to 
SECTION. 
 
I would like to ask you about the 
likelihood of the following climate 
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change consequences occurring 
over the next 50 years in South 
Australia.  
 
B.2 How likely is it that more 
frequent and extreme heat 
waves will occur due to climate 
change? 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not likely at all 
2. Unlikely 
3. Neutral Likely 
4. Very likely 
5. Don’t know  
6. Refused  
 
B.3 How likely is it that there will be 
more frequent flooding from 
rain due to climate change? 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not likely at all 
2. Unlikely 
3. Neutral  
4. Likely 
5. Very likely 
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused  
B.4 How likely is it that there will be 
flooding from sea level rise due 
to climate change? 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not likely at all 
2. Unlikely 
3. Neutral  
4. Likely 
5. Very likely 
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused  
  
B.5 How likely is it that there will be 
more water shortages and 
droughts, due to climate 
change?  
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not likely at all 
2. Unlikely 
3. Neutral  
4. Likely 
5. Very likely 
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused  
  
B.6 How likely is it that there will be 
an increased threat from 
serious disease, such as 
dengue fever and Ross River 
virus due to climate change? 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not likely at all 
2. Unlikely 
3. Neutral  
4. Likely 
5. Very likely 
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused  
  
B.7 How likely is it that food 
shortages will occur due to 
climate change? 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not likely at all 
2. Unlikely 
3. Neutral  
4. Likely 
5. Very likely 
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused  
B.8 How likely is it that there will be 
economic consequences on 
agriculture and other industry 
sectors due to climate change? 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not likely at all 
2. Unlikely 
3. Neutral  
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4. Likely 
5. Very likely 
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused  
  
B.9 How likely is it that there will be 
a negative impact on the 
natural environment, such as 
animals and plant life, due to 
climate change? 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not likely at all 
2. Unlikely 
3. Neutral  
4. Likely 
5. Very likely 
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused  
  
Now, in your personal opinion, how 
severe will the following 
consequences of climate change be 
in South Australia over the next 50 
years?  
 
B.10 How severe will the 
consequences be from more 
frequent and extreme heat 
waves, related to climate 
change?  
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not at all severe 
2. Not so severe  
3. Neutral 
4. Severe 
5. Very severe  
6. Don’t know 
7.  Refused  
 
How severe will the consequences 
be from flooding from rain due to 
climate change? 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not at all severe 
2. Not so severe  
3. Neutral 
4. Severe 
5. Very severe  
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused 
 
B.11 How severe will the 
consequences be from sea 
level rise associated with 
climate change? 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not at all severe 
2. Not so severe  
3. Neutral 
4. Severe 
5. Very severe  
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused 
  
B.12 How severe will water 
shortages and droughts be due 
to climate change? 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not at all severe 
2. Not so severe  
3. Neutral 
4. Severe 
5. Very severe  
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused 
  
B.13 How severe will the 
consequences from serious 
disease and illness, such as 
dengue fever, Ross River virus, 
and heat stroke, be due to 
climate change?   
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not at all severe 
2. Not so severe  
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3. Neutral 
4. Severe 
5. Very severe  
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused 
B.14 How severe will be the negative 
consequences for agriculture 
and other industry sectors be, 
due to climate change?  
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not at all severe 
2. Not so severe  
3. Neutral 
4. Severe 
5. Very severe  
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused 
 
B.15 How severe will food shortages 
be, due to climate change? 
 (Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not at all severe 
2. Not so severe  
3. Neutral 
4. Severe 
5. Very severe  
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused 
 
B.16 How severe will the 
consequences be for the 
natural environment due to 
climate change be (that is non-
human life, such as animals 
and plant life)? 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not at all severe 
2. Not so severe  
3. Neutral 
4. Severe 
5. Very severe  
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused 
  
B.17 When do you think the effects 
of climate change will begin to 
happen?  
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. In 50 years 
2. Within 20 years 
3. In a few years 
4. Already happening 
5. Will never happen. Climate 
change is not real 
6. Don’t know 
7. Refused 
B.18 How worried are you about 
climate change?    
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Not at all concerned 
2. Not very concerned 
3. Neutral 
4. Concerned 
5. Very concerned 
6. Don’t know 
7. Refused 
 
B.19 Thinking about the risks 
associated with climate 
change, who do you worry 
about the most  :  
 (Read options.  Single response) 
1. Myself and my family 
2. My community 
3. My state 
4. Australia 
5. Other developed countries 
6. Developing countries 
7. Other (specify)………….. 
8. Don’t know 
9. Refused 
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Please tell me how you agree or 
disagree with the following 
statements  
 
B.20 The risks that climate change 
presents to me and my family 
can be reduced by my own 
actions. 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neutral 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly Agree 
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused 
  
B.21 If my community bands 
together, we can manage the 
threat of climate change. 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neutral 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly Agree 
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused 
  
B.22 It is the government that has 
ultimate responsibility for 
protecting me from climate 
change risks, such as flooding 
and water shortages.  
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neutral 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly Agree 
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused 
 
B.23 I want to do something that 
protects me from climate 
change, but I just don’t think 
anything will work. 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neutral 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly Agree 
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused 
  
C. Affect (Word association)  
 
C.1 What is the first word or image 
that comes to mind when you 
think about the risks 
associated with climate 
change? 
1. Specify 
…………………………… 
2. Don’t know  
3. Refused 
 
Sequence Guide: If C.1 = 2 Go to D.1 
 
 
C.2 How would you rate this word 
or image in this context?  
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Very Negative 
2. Negative 
3. Neutral 
4. Don’t know  
5. Positive 
6. Very Positive 
7. Don’t know 
8. Refused 
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D. Behavioural intentions 
(adaptation preparedness) 
 
Thinking about the risks associated 
with climate change, now and into 
the future, I would now like to ask 
some questions about how you 
would cope with these risks. 
 
Please tell me if you strongly 
disagree, disagree, don’t know, 
agree or strongly agree with the 
following statement: 
 
D.1 It will be necessary for me to 
make changes to my daily 
routine to deal with climate 
change risks, such as water 
shortages, and heat waves in 
the future? 
(Read options.  Single response) 
1. Strongly disagree 
2. Disagree 
3. Neutral 
4. Agree 
5. Strongly Agree 
6. Don’t know  
7. Refused 
 
D.2 When thinking about the risk of 
more frequent and extreme 
heat waves in the future, how 
would you protect yourself 
from this risk? 
(Open Response).   
1.  (…………) 
2. Adaptation is not possible 
3. Don’t know 
4. Refused 
 
D.3  When thinking about the risk of 
flooding, either from rain or 
sea level rise, how would 
protect yourself and your 
property from this risk?  
   (Open Response).   
1.  (…………) 
2. Adaptation is not possible 
3. I don’t live in an area prone to 
flooding 
4. Don’t know 
5. Refused 
 
E. Political orientation  
 
We are interested in understanding 
the relationship between political 
affiliation and attitudes towards 
climate change.  We would now like 
to ask you about how you normally 
vote… 
 
E.1 I traditionally vote for the: 
(Read Options. Single 
Response).   
1. Liberal Party 
2. National Party 
3. Greens 
4. Labor 
5. Independent 
6. Swinging voter 
7. Other (Specify)……………....... 
8. Refused  
 
Z. Demographics  
Now to finish with some general 
questions. 
 
Z.1 What is your work status? 
(Read Options If Necessary.  
Single Response.  Interviewer 
note:  self-employed is either full 
or part time) 
1. Full time employed 
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2. Part time/casual 
employment 
3. Unemployed 
4. Home duties 
5. Retired 
6. Student 
7. Unable to work because of 
disability/ workcover / 
invalid 
8. Other (Specify) 
9. Don’t know 
10. Refused 
 
Z.2 Which best describes the 
highest educational 
qualification you have 
obtained? 
(Read options. Single response) 
1. Still at school 
2. Left school at 16 years or 
less 
3. Left school after age 16 
4. Left school after age 16 but 
still studying 
5. Trade / Apprenticeship 
6. Certificate / Diploma 
7. Bachelor degree or higher 
8. Refused 
 
Z.3 The next question is about 
housing.  Is this dwelling …. 
(Read Options.  Single 
Response) 
1. Owned or being purchased 
by the occupants 
2. Rented from the Housing SA 
3. Rented privately 
4. Retirement village 
5. Other (specify 
6. Refused 
 
Z.4 I would now like to ask you 
about your household’s 
income.  We are interested in 
how income relates to lifestyle 
and access to health services.  
Before tax is taken out, which 
of the following ranges best 
describes your household’s 
income, from all sources, over 
the last 12 months? 
(Read Options. Single Response) 
1. Up to $12,000 
2. $12,001 - $20,000 
3. $20,001 - $30,000 
4. $30,001 - $40,000 
5. $40,001 - $50,000 
6. $50,001 - $60,000 
7. $60,001 - $80,000 
8. $80,001 - $100,000 
9. $100,001 - $150,000 
10. $150,001 - $200,000 
11. More than $200,000 
12. Not stated/refused 
13. Don't know 
 
 
 
 
 
 

